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**JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL**

**TRANSFORMING THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: ADAPTING
OPERATIONAL CAPACITIES AND CAPABILITIES TO THE POST-9/11
REALITY, EVOLVING INTERAGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE
CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY**

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College, or the Department of Defense.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ATA	Antiterrorism Assistance Program
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CT	Counter Terrorism
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
EO	Executive Order
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FSI	Foreign Service Institute
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academy
JTF	Joint Task Force
LEGAT	Legal Attaché Office
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
PDD	Presidential Decision Directives
PM	Office of Political/Military Affairs
RSO	Regional Security Officer
SA	Special Agent
S/CT	Office of the Coordinator for Counter Terrorism
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability
USG	United States Government
USSS	United States Secret Service

ABSTRACT

Despite the call for U.S. government security agencies to transform themselves in President Bush's 2002 National Security Strategy, the Department of State lags behind many of the other elements of national power in that its capabilities and capacities remain much as they were prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Seams and gaps in policy and operations are magnified during times of conflict. Most experts agree that future conflicts will be asymmetrical in nature, with such factors becoming more visible and noticeable than during peacetime. President Bush has indicated that the Global War on Terrorism will likely continue for a generation, so transformation of national security agencies is an urgent requirement.

The Department of State's deficiencies are predominantly in the operational sector. Chronic shortfalls in budget, material resources, an inflexible personnel system, an antiquated organizational structure, and lack of a formal integrated planning process represent significant obstacles that must be overcome for the Department to carry out its operational mission. The overall national interest of the United States requires that these challenges be overcome or mitigated, and that the Department of State continue to represent a capable, relevant, and viable element of national power.

The purpose of this study is to assess the transformation of the Department of State and determine if the proposed changes adequately address the initiatives and recommendations contained in the 2002 National Security Strategy and numerous

government sponsored and independent studies. This study identifies where the Department is in terms of its organization and available resources against where it needs to go. Measured within the context of the post-9/11 security reality, both existing and emerging capabilities of the Department are contrasted against those in other sectors of the national security establishment.

The departments and agencies within the United States government possessed greatly varying capabilities and responded in various ways to the President's call for immediate action in the wake of the attacks. A select few enjoyed the organizational structure, resources, and logistical capacity to adequately respond in a sufficient scale to a national emergency. Unfortunately for the country, many interagency institutions did not fall into that category. Developing and sustaining such capabilities are essential to the success and continued relevance of the DOS in the post-9/11 reality. Prior to the attacks, the focus of the DOS was on responding to emergencies as they occurred. Its planning was based on a slow and deliberate mobilization requiring considerable time and procurement of additional fiscal and personnel resources, before such a force could be made available. However, before they were able to develop a quick-react capacity, the relevance and performance of the DOS were again questioned by many in the immediate aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The DOS was unable to respond to the urgent and overwhelming requirement to field a force capable of performing nation-building related tasks.

In light of its operational shortcomings, the DOS has been forced to take a back seat in some critical foreign policy areas. It has been supplanted by DOD in many venues in coordinating interagency policy and operations overseas. Its authority and

prestige has been eroded in part due to frustration at its inability to place personnel and resources on the ground when and where needed. The DOD has begun to resource missions and functions that traditionally fell within the DOS mandate largely because they are the only interagency player available to fill an obvious vacuum. While these encroachments appear to be of a temporary nature, the Department runs the risk of their becoming permanent unless DOS quickly takes action to fill the void.

Although some progress has been made, it would appear that much more needs to be done. In what is considered to be a major policy change, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently announced her intent to transform the Department during a speech at Georgetown University. Transformation is just the latest in a series of strategies designed to increase the effectiveness and sharpen the focus of the DOS. This study examines the following areas to determine exactly where the Department is and where it needs to go: review the organization, infrastructure, doctrine, and its missions; examine the evolution of the interagency process and where the DOS fits in; identify areas of concern that may require adjustments and provide a related list of proposed recommendations; and provide a conclusion and identify topics and issues worthy of future research.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The major institutions of American national security were designed in a different era to meet different requirements. ALL of them must be transformed.

2002 National Security Strategy¹

The United States Department of State (DOS) has yet to fully embrace the need to adapt to the security realities of the post-9/11 global environment. The Department continues today with basically the same mission, organization, infrastructure and resources as it did during the days of the “evil” empire of the former Soviet Union. Given the evolving international security challenges of the 21st Century, the DOS must increase its operational capabilities and capacities and reassume its leadership role within the national interagency process. During a speech at Georgetown University, on January 18, 2006, the Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, outlined an ambitious blueprint for transforming the DOS, but at this early juncture, it is unclear if the proposed changes are just the initial steps in a comprehensive overhaul, or a perception that merely tweaking the existing system is all that is required². The scope of this research is intentionally limited to the operational components of the DOS, given the breadth of the full range of responsibilities of the Department.

Secretary Rice defines the intent of her transformational democracy program as being “rooted in partnership, not paternalism--in doing things with people, not for them.” Part of her plan involves the repositioning of diplomatic resources away from a posture that persists from the days of the Cold War, to transferring those positions in emerging

regions in the Third World. She also wants to create Regional Public Diplomacy Centers, to push diplomats away from “behind their desks” out into the field and beyond and shaping outcomes, not merely reporting on them. This initiative will be supported by so-called American Presence Posts, where a diplomat is positioned to live and work outside of the embassy, and the creation of Virtual Presence Posts, that are envisioned to serve as internet sites manned by one or more diplomats, and intended to service young people throughout the Third World.³

Additional transformational initiatives outlined by Secretary Rice to provide the work force with new skills include: enhanced training; multi-region expertise; assignments to challenging posts; hands-on management of programs; and public diplomacy. She also plans to expand programs for diplomats to work jointly with other federal agencies such as S/CRS where the new office will seek to develop a civilian officer corps, and the Political Advisor (POLAD) program.⁴

The 9/11 terrorist attacks exposed the fact that most departments and agencies were still organized and equipped to fight the Cold War, and had not appropriately adapted their strategies and operations to respond to the challenges of the 21st Century.⁵ The required changes have in many cases been quite traumatic, such as the ongoing “growing pains” being experienced by the newly created Department of Homeland Security. The Central Intelligence Agency is living through similar problems related to the creation of the new National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and Directorate for National Intelligence (DNI), and the subsequent reorganization of the national intelligence agencies.⁶⁷ The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also is working through a difficult period since their primary mission has been changed to preventing acts

of terrorism vice their traditional role of investigating and prosecuting such acts.⁸ Some of the turmoil associated with these changes is resulting in critical losses of key personnel due to early retirements and resignations prompted by dissatisfaction with the “new” order. Some institutions have continued relatively unchanged due to a variety of reasons. The need to respond immediately to the 9/11 attacks placed some departments and agencies directly in the spotlight and focused attention on inherent deficiencies and weaknesses while others, such as the DOS, have managed to survive relatively unscathed.

In the meantime, the Department faces tremendous challenges through a wide range of activities to increase its capacity to function as a responsive and reliable element of national power. These changes will have to be made while simultaneously working and meeting goals within the existing interagency framework. It also can modify its organization to maximize scarce resources, taking the lead in post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, developing capability to execute seamless transitions from military to diplomatic led operations in war zones, and numerous other issues. This review identifies what changes have been made to better enable the DOS to respond to new challenges and requirements; and, what weaknesses or deficiencies still need to be addressed. The review should be seen within a context of DOS capabilities to conduct traditional strategy-related missions, in addition to expanded requirements to carry out recently assumed operational responsibilities, and how the Department uses these capacities to execute its mission(s) in conformance with the National Security Strategy (NSS).

The DOS has continuing diplomatic and operational requirements that extend throughout all phases of a traditional military campaign, but recently it was formally

tasked by the Bush Administration to lead the coordination and implementation of Phase 4 post-conflict stability and reconstruction efforts.⁹ These post-conflict interagency operations fill the vital gap between domination of the enemy on the military battlefield and achieving the desired Political End State. Unfortunately, the aftermath of the U.S. led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (OEF and OIF, respectively), together with the Global War on Terror (GWOT), reflects a general loss of momentum and legitimacy in the implementation of U.S. Grand Strategy due primarily to a lack of well-planned and coordinated post-conflict interagency operations.

There was, and continues to be, a critical requirement for U.S. interagency partners to ally themselves with the military and intelligence assets on the ground and quickly restore security and vital government infrastructure (i.e. electricity, water, gasoline, etc.) in those conflicts. Their inability to do so up to this point has the potential of squandering the tremendous military and political victories attained in the initial phases of those campaigns. Had the national political leadership provided the means for the DOS and other interagency partners to be better organized, staffed, and resourced, the desired Political End States for these conflicts probably would have been much closer to fruition than they are under the present circumstances.

Many critical policy and operations related decisions were made in the time-sensitive atmosphere of Washington in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Because of the political need to take quick, decisive action, normal processes and procedures were often bypassed or compressed, with many unorthodox methods utilized to achieve short-term goals. Now that much of the shock has worn off, national policymakers must make decisions in the near future of whether or not to perpetuate or extend those actions. With

the emphasis on military and intelligence options, the role and function of the DOS was considerably modified. Informed decisions must be made on whether these short term options are sustainable and desirable for long-term goals and objectives.

While much thought has been given to transforming the military, homeland security, and the intelligence agencies, relatively little attention has been focused on the DOS, which forms the backbone of U.S. foreign policy and whose Embassies and Consulates serve as focal points for U.S. interests overseas. A thorough understanding of DOS capabilities and weaknesses is critical for U.S. policymakers when assigning tasks and making important strategic, operational, and budgetary decisions. The bounty of the post-9/11 supplemental funding bills has come and gone and future budgetary decisions will be made with little room for error. Duplication of effort must be minimized or eliminated altogether and vital missions and responsibilities “nested” within appropriate departments or agencies.

The 2002 NSS focuses on eliminating threats to national security before they can reach American shores and transforming “America’s National Security Institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.”¹⁰ This research focuses on a comprehensive assessment of the DOS from an operational capabilities perspective to determine if it has the capacity to support those goals. This information would benefit interagency partners by helping them to better coordinate and synchronize their respective strategies and operations and avoid duplication of effort. Both the DOS and DOD formulate and implement foreign policy in support of national security goals and share the lead in projecting many aspects of national power.

In order too validate the thesis that prompted this research, the author compares the capabilities and performance of the DOS in the stabilization and reconstruction phases of the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the GWOT, and contrasts it with that of the DOD. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 effectively transformed the DOD and forced it to integrate the various military services into a joint force.¹¹ The legislation provided it with a new and improved framework to continue to adapt and reform itself as required meeting challenges far into the future. By contrast, the DOS has not benefited from any such legislation and is only now beginning to formulate a strategy to transform itself to keep pace with the DOD and other interagency partners to face the challenges of the post-9/11 world. By comparing and contrasting these two strongly related elements of national power, the author intends to use the results as a barometer to determine where the DOS is, and where it needs to go to reach its greatest potential. The results of the analysis provided in the areas of: personnel; material resources; organizational structure and agility; strategic and operational planning; interagency leadership and coordination; and budget will be provided at the beginning of Chapter 6 and are reflected in the list of issues and recommendations that follow.

CHAPTER 2

SCENESETTER

On September 11, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country. Americans have known wars, but for the past 136 years they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war, but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning.

Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians.

All this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.

Remarks by President George W. Bush, September 20, 2001, during his address to a joint session of Congress.

Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the permeating sense of vulnerability felt by many Americans forced government officials to reappraise existing strategies, organizational structures and mission statements, in order to respond to the shattered security situation. President Bush's decision to respond by attacking al Qaeda in their sanctuary in Afghanistan, and removing the Taliban from power, soon revealed that many United States government entities were totally unprepared to adequately respond to the new challenge of a global war against terror.¹² The DOS, like many other departments and agencies, lacked the appropriate infrastructure, resources, and organizational and operational agility to properly answer the call for immediate action.

The conflict in Afghanistan, and the later war in Iraq, revealed other serious capability and resource related weaknesses that prevented some elements of national power from effectively carrying out their roles in the continuing evolution of security strategy. The aftermath of those two conflicts continue to require intensive coordination and oversight of nation building ventures on a scale not seen since the end of World War

II.¹³ Despite the Bush Administration's initial criticism and aversion to becoming involved in nation building programs, it soon became apparent that Afghanistan and Iraq would require immense investments in funding and resources to avoid those nations slipping back into the abyss. The transition from military to civilian control of stability and reconstruction operations was greatly complicated by the lack of integrated planning between interagency partners, the intensity of the insurgencies, and continued requirement for logistical and other assistance from the DOD.

The Administration took some initial steps to address these issues with the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CR) within the DOS. However, Congress has not provided the appropriate increases in the Department's budget, and there continues to be serious funding and personnel shortfalls.¹⁴ An independent task force created to assess U.S. progress in developing military and civilian capability to meet the demands of stabilization and reconstruction concluded that "the magnitude of the commitment required by Iraq may be unique but the demand for properly trained and equipped military and civilian personnel to stabilize and rebuild nations is not."¹⁵ There is every indication that the need for additional nation-building programs will continue and this capability should not be evaluated as a one-time application, but as a continuing requirement in the foreseeable future.

On September 17, 2002, the post-9/11 security strategy was formalized with the release of President Bush's National Security Strategy (NSS).¹⁶ The NSS rejected the policy of the previous Clinton Administration that sought to treat terrorism as largely a judicial and law enforcement issue. The new strategy stresses that the war on terror must be fought with every element of national power. However, in reality, the Bush

Administration has focused primarily on the military, homeland security, and intelligence capabilities to fight the war, and by limiting increases in resources significantly marginalized the active participation of others. A review of the principal beneficiaries of major increases in funding since 9/11 serves to reinforce this point.

The 2002 NSS also reflects the Bush Administration's impatience with getting things done in the traditional manner (diplomacy, judicial/economic, and law enforcement), and a greater emphasis on "trophy hunting" tactics, or quick solutions to complex problems. President Bush was enamored with Cofer Black, the CIA's Counterterrorism Chief, especially when Black promised "When we're through with them, they will have flies walking across their eyeballs", referring to how the Agency would deal with al Qaeda in Afghanistan.¹⁷ This tendency is also reflected in policy decisions on the classification and detention of "non-combatants" in Guantanamo Bay and the expansion of controversial (and some have argued illegal) interrogation techniques to extract intelligence information from detainees. Large-scale utilization of "renditions" of terror suspects to prisons in countries with abysmal human rights records and use by the CIA of secret detention facilities in foreign countries for "high value" targets also underscores the lack of trust or confidence that the Administration has with more traditional approaches to fighting terrorism. Protecting the homeland from terrorist threats should clearly be the number one priority, but undercutting internationally recognized "rule of law" would seem to be a risky long-term policy. Extraordinary tactics have a place in the GWOT, but more than 4 ½ years after the 9/11 tragedies, a clear policy outlining how the elements of power will be utilized to ultimately win the war has not yet been delineated.¹⁸

....“that must be made absolutely clear, namely that war is simply the continuation of policy by other means.”

Von Clausewitz

Implementation of the changes in policy and foreign affairs outlined in the NSS are occurring largely in an ad hoc manner without a true mechanism to compel and coordinate interagency strategy and operations. The National Security Council (NSC) is traditionally regarded as the organization responsible for coordinating and implementing national policy initiatives, but recent history indicates that there is a growing gap between strategic policy goals and how they are being translated into operational reality on the ground. There is a growing realization that there is a glaring need for a mechanism to compel agencies to take action and hold them accountable for their support of strategic policy guidelines.¹⁹ Some have even called for legislation to regulate interagency operations similar to what the Goldwater-Nichols Act accomplished for the military. However, the executive branch is opposed to allowing Congress to become more involved in actions they see as inherently Presidential. Opponents believe such legislation is unnecessary, and would effectively handcuff the President and deny him the discretionary authority to utilize his cabinet as he or she sees fit. The calls for codifying the interagency process are far from unanimous, as there are many who are satisfied with the present NSC configuration and feel that mandated policy on strategic and/or operational issues would represent the ultimate micromanagement of United States policy.²⁰

The Hurricane Katrina disaster has given new currency to the idea of formalizing some sort of strategic and operational Interagency Policy. The obvious lack of adequate planning and resources to respond to this natural disaster is once again raising questions

about how federal, state and local agencies coordinate their efforts and delineate lines of responsibilities for each. Recent Congressional reports were scathing in their criticism of government response at all levels and are demanding action.²¹ The weak and disorganized response indicated a general operational environment which reflected an “everyone is in charge, but nobody is in charge” type of approach to national disasters. Many in Congress and the general public are concerned that a future terrorist attack may generate the same type of confused response.

The large-scale military action undertaken almost immediately in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and the continuing conflict in Iraq and the GWOT, have resulted in the DOD assuming a major leadership role in the Interagency Process (IAP). Lacking any legal or doctrinal authority to compel actions by other departments or agencies, DOD responded to a perceived (and shared by many) lack of leadership in the interagency area, and created Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs).²² Establishing the JIACGs was an effort by the various Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) to pull together the appropriate interagency players and coordinate operations within the COCOMs respective areas of operations (AOR). In addition to military and civilian members from the DOD, JIACGs have interagency representatives, usually an exchange officer, to provide input and advice within their areas of responsibility or expertise. While the POLAD (Political Advisor) works directly for the Combatant Commander and is not assigned to the JIACG, they are usually available to provide advice as needed. Oftentimes, POLADs are former Ambassadors, or current or former senior Foreign Service Officers of the rank of Foreign Executive Officer-Counselor (FEOC), or higher. They provide advice on political, economic, or diplomatic issues to the COCOMS and

function as a vital link between the COCOMS and the DOS in their given area of responsibility (AOR).

The DOS is the lead agency responsible for executing and implementing the President's foreign policy but, at times, the Department has been pushed to the margins by the military (and occasionally others) and, as a consequence, plays only a supporting role in many venues.²³ While this arrangement is appropriate within designated "war zones", it occurs in other geographical areas as well, especially given the nature of the GWOT. It also has had the effect of creating a vacuum of sorts, the result of which sees other departments and agencies rushing to fill the void, or acting independently in the foreign policy arena and consequently competing with the DOS and DOD for primacy. Strategic and operational level goals are now being pursued by a variety of agencies in a stovepipe fashion. Not surprisingly, there is considerable duplication of effort across the entire foreign policy spectrum which has resulted in a tendency to expand operational boundaries.²⁴ A growing source of concern is that the expansion of operational boundaries is occurring despite the looming prospect of shrinking budgets in the immediate and foreseeable future. Expanded missions coupled with shrinking budgets can have the undesirable affect of individual agencies having to lower performance levels in their respective core mission area.

A good example of the confusion that can result when there is a lack of coordination of international diplomacy was the Turkish Government's refusal to allow U.S. military forces to use bases and transit the country in support of the Iraq invasion in March 2003.²⁵ There were a series of breakdowns in diplomacy and foreign relations blunders committed in the lead-up to the key vote of the Turkish Parliament just prior to

the outbreak of hostilities. While Turkish and U.S. diplomats were negotiating support for U.S. military forces, DOD officials met with Turkish military counterparts and elicited agreements which ultimately were not supportable by Turkish officials. Unfortunately, the miscues and confusion continued until well after the fall of Baghdad, when actions and statements by the Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) and others continued to strain relationships between Turkey and the United States.

There is often a considerable difference of opinion of how the DOS views its own depth and quality of strategic and operational planning compared to how DOD and other agencies perceive it. There is a longstanding and widely held view within the DOD that non-military organizations suffer from a marked lack of understanding and appreciation of the need to employ “systematic planning procedures.”²⁶ While there may be some merit to their frustration, it is more likely that the different approaches to planning are more a direct result of insufficient dedicated resources as opposed to values linked to the function. For example, some COCOMs have full-time planning staffs (J-3, and J-5) with as many as 1,000 employees or more. In contrast, DOS strategic and operational planning is largely confined to the Resource Management Bureau (RM), POLADs, regional and functional bureaus, Embassy country teams and, more recently, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS).

Embassy level contingency planning primarily takes the form of Emergency Action Plans (EAPs). EAPs are noteworthy in that they inherently involve all elements of the Embassy country teams with specific responsibilities integrated into the various scenarios and result in what are essentially joint interagency plans. More specific information on DOS planning will be addressed later in this study.

There are considerable differences in institutional cultures and viewpoints which sometimes lead to confusion and misunderstandings. There have been a number of studies examining the differences between the DOD and DOS cultures and exploring the reasons for those differences.²⁷ A Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator study revealed that the predominant personality profile of DOD personnel is ISTJ (Introverted, Sensing, Thinking, Judging), while DOS personnel reflect a predominance of INTJ (Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking, Judging) types. ISTJs tend to be “factual, dedicated, thorough, systematic, steadfast, practical, organized, realistic, duty bound, sensible, painstaking, and reliable.” INTJs tend to be independent, logical, critical, original, systems minded, firm, visionary, theoretical, demanding, private, global, and autonomous.²⁸ While both are successful within their own environments and missions, when grouped together, they function much more effectively. These personality type differences reveal that they are opposites when it comes to perceiving things or acquiring information. These differences in attitude and personality are reflected in their approach toward planning. As a whole, the DOS tends to take great pride in its ability to respond to daily challenges and considers their flexibility a virtue. DOD perceives a lack of interest in becoming involved in joint planning processes by the various agencies as a sign they are more “turf” conscious and prefer to keep their planning to themselves and not share with other interagency partners. A 1961 Joint Staff memorandum warned, “...these inhibitions of other governmental agencies must in some way be overcome.”²⁹ Of course, there is a degree of hypocrisy within that view since, due to security classifications, DOD often does not share details of campaign plans with outside agencies until they are completed, just prior to execution, or not at all. If there is to be genuine sharing within the planning

community, reciprocity should be required by all partners and classifications will need to be crafted so that appropriate portions of each plan can be shared with cleared personnel on a “need to know” basis given their job responsibilities.

Still another area of potential friction among interagency partners is how individual agencies organize their global affairs.³⁰ The DOS Regional Bureaus and DOD COCOMs areas of responsibility are not consistent. This seemingly minor issue impacts not only the respective department’s vision of the world, but also their perspective relative to programs and policies for a given area. This situation also lends itself to a lack of interagency synergy which most agree is vital for success in the GWOT and responding to the challenges of the 21st Century.

We will direct every resource at our command - - every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war - - to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.

**George W. Bush, September 20, 2001
Address to a joint session of Congress**

The GWOT requires a coordinated interagency response to engage and employ all components of U.S. national power. Many terrorism experts argue that the term GWOT itself is misleading, counterproductive, and should be changed. They feel that the struggle against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks are Islamic-fascists and that declaring war against all terrorists weakens the U.S. Government’s focus on the ultimate prize of Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network, and its loosely related counterparts around the world.³¹ Based on its unique nature, the GWOT encompasses much more than military on military conflict. They suggest that the GWOT is a contest of ideologies that may endure for an entire generation. Terror is the primary tactic being utilized by the Islamic fundamentalist extremists; however, the ideological root cause of the “war” must

be addressed before America can claim victory. The ideological battle within this war is being waged against extremists who take a narrow (and most say erroneous) interpretation of the Koran and use it as a basis for attacking the United States specifically and western civilization in general. Various non-military actors will be required to play a critical role in U.S. strategy for countering continuing threats to U.S. security posed by the extremist terrorist networks.³²

Within the military, the four basic elements of national power are often referred to as the DIME. The DIME is comprised of the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic sectors. It is commonly referred to as the four-legged stool upon which national power is balanced. Each Administration has a preference for where the focus of the DIME will be concentrated. The Bush Administration criticized the previous administration for its policy of dealing with terrorism as primarily a law enforcement issue, but in practice, they have merely replaced law enforcement with the military, and have not come upon a real balance to effectively bring all elements into the fight. They have failed to delineate where and when each element should and will be used and who makes that decision. For example, should the military be used only when other elements are either not available or not politically expedient? Under what conditions should the military employ its “kill or capture” option in their counterterrorist (CT) operations, and when should they consider host nation or traditional law enforcement options? Just when and under what circumstances should a CT operation and target be carried out through the traditional judicial process of apprehension and prosecution? Some would say that the decision was made long ago when the NSS directed the FBI to change its official policy from one of prosecution to prevention of terrorist acts.³³ There have been cases

where the law enforcement method was successfully employed, but it is not clear who or what triggers those decisions, nor the factors considered in reaching them.

As stated earlier in this study, the Bush Administration and Congress took significant steps to enhance the ability of the U.S. to defend its citizens and interests around the world with the implementation of sweeping changes within the federal government bureaucracy. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and reorganization of the national security agencies represent the most significant modifications to national security since enactment of the National Security Act in 1947.³⁴ Among the numerous post-9/11 changes to the NSS and U.S. foreign policy, President Bush cited the inherent “right” of America to take preemptive action to deter and/or defeat potential attacks against the United States, our allies and friends.³⁵ In effect, he put the rest of the world on notice that we would not wait for our enemies to attack us first, and the U.S. was prepared to take whatever action necessary to deter aggression. The President further called for nations to decide whether they were with us, or against us in the GWOT that he called for in response to the 9/11 attacks. These changes in national security policy put enormous pressure on the DOS to ensure that nations understood exactly what the President was asking them to do and to convince them of the importance to take his statements seriously.

The newly established National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the military’s JIACGs, have attempted to fill the interagency policy void, but still lack appropriate authority to compel action by the various elements of national power.³⁶ In 2003, an Interagency Steering Group (ISG) meeting recommended that a National Interagency Coordination Group (NIACG) be established to synchronize post-conflict

recovery and reconstruction operations.³⁷ Some security and policy experts have proposed new legislation modeled along the line of the Goldwater-Nicholls Act of 1986, which forced the military to reorganize and transform into a joint force.³⁸ However, to date, Congress has not yet considered a new bill and, given the experience of the Goldwater Nicholls legislation, it would probably take several years to legislate and implement.

CHAPTER 3

DOS ORGANIZATION

The scope of this study is not sufficient to support an in-depth analysis of the entire organization and individual components of the DOS. Most national interagency partners are at least somewhat familiar with the strategic responsibilities of the Department in the foreign policy arena. However, many are not aware that the DOS also has an operational side which is not as well known, and a source of at least some of the frustration and friction with those interagency partners. This chapter provides some historical background of the Department and delineates responsibilities related to the interagency process. It also examines the relationships of the operational bureaus and offices with the DOD and other interagency partners, and briefly describes their respective missions and capabilities.

The DOS is an institution built on tradition with a rich history dating from shortly after the American Revolution. In 1787, the United States Constitution gave the President responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign affairs.³⁹ Quickly realizing that a strong executive branch institution would help him conduct foreign affairs and provide advice, George Washington asked Congress for help. Congress responded by establishing the first federal agency in 1789 with the creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs in 1789. Later that year, they changed its name to the Department of State (DOS).⁴⁰ As the first cabinet level department, DOS responsibilities initially extended far beyond the conduct of foreign affairs, but as the new government matured,

many of those functions were transferred to other newly created departments and agencies during the 19th Century.

Both the Executive and Legislative Branches share constitutional responsibilities for formulating and executing U.S. foreign policy. Within the Executive Branch, the DOS is recognized as the lead foreign affairs agency and the Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor. The Secretary of State is fourth in line of succession to the presidency after the Vice President, Speaker of the House, and Senate Majority Leader. Although DOS has the lead in foreign affairs, it does not dictate foreign policy for the U.S. government. Most cabinet level institutions have international programs, and each brings a parochial difference of perspective on foreign relations to the table. In the George W. Bush administration, officials such as the Vice President, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, and other officials within the President's inner circle have exercised significant influence on his foreign policy decisions.

At interagency meetings, State Department representatives bring a wealth of experience to the table from dealing with foreign governments and cultures throughout their career. These real-life experiences, derived from living and working abroad in an array of posts and positions, give them a unique perspective in framing recommendations relating to foreign policy. By virtue of its domestic and foreign mission requirements, the Department has an unusual breadth of information about vital interagency partners. In his memoirs, Secretary Shultz wrote:⁴¹

“As secretary, I could see that I had at hand an extraordinary information machine; it could produce a flow of reports on what was happening in real time, background on what had been done before and how that had worked, analyses of alternative courses of action, and ideas on what might be done.

The Department is a great engine of diplomacy for the secretary to use in carrying out the president's foreign policy.”

Shortly after being elected for a second term as president, George W. Bush nominated Condoleezza Rice to replace Colin Powell as the Secretary of State. It wasn't long before her influence on foreign policy decisions within the administration became apparent, as her efforts for a return to strategic engagement began to bear fruit in Germany and other countries whose relations with the U.S. had become strained.⁴² Traditionally, the DOS advances U.S. policy objectives and interests by means of exercising its role of advising the President in foreign affairs and implementing his policies. The Department also supports the [foreign affairs](#) activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies such as the [Departments of Commerce](#), Agriculture, Justice, Homeland Security, and the [U.S. Agency for International Development](#) (AID).⁴³ It also provides an array of important services to U.S. citizens and foreigners seeking to visit or immigrate to the U.S.

The U.S. maintains a diplomatic presence in more than 180 countries through a network of Embassies, Consulates, and Consular Agencies, and also posts representatives in many international organizations.⁴⁴ About 4,000 DOS Foreign Service Officers (FSO) and 3,500 employees with specialized skills represent American interests overseas. There are also an additional 30,000 Foreign Service National (FSN) and third-country employees that serve in U.S. missions. They analyze political, economic, and social issues in their assigned countries, draft reports detailing their analysis, and respond to the needs of American interests outside of the country.

While much of their focus is on our foreign missions overseas, about 2,000 FSOs, 8,000 General Schedule (GS) employees, and 1,500 specialists are posted domestically

and perform a host of tasks supporting diplomatic missions and foreign policy initiatives.⁴⁵ A little known fact is that the DOS staffs numerous offices located outside of the Washington capital area. The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) maintains 14 passport agencies, while the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) staffs 8 field offices, 13 resident offices, and 2 satellite offices located throughout the United States.

The foreign affairs budget funds U.S. representation abroad, services to U.S. citizens and nationals, foreign assistance, countering international crime, and foreign military training programs.⁴⁶ The DOS is responsible for protecting and providing emergency services to U.S. citizens living or traveling abroad and promoting and expanding international business opportunities for U.S. companies and corporations. It also coordinates the drafting and release of foreign policy related information to U.S. and foreign public audiences. As part of reciprocal agreements and treaties, the DOS manages the issuance of credentials to diplomats and accredited staff, and also provides related services to diplomats accorded [diplomatic immunity](#) in the United States.

The DOS leads interagency coordination in developing and implementing foreign policy and manages the foreign affairs budget and other foreign affairs resources. It is also responsible for leading and coordinating U.S. representation abroad, and communicating U.S. foreign policy to foreign governments and international organizations. The DOS conducts negotiations and concludes agreements and treaties on a wide range of issues from trade to nuclear weapons, and also coordinates and supports international activities of other U.S. agencies and officials.

According to the Department's most recent strategic planning statement, the primary mission of the DOS is to "create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous

world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.⁴⁷” The DOS mission directly supports the NSS, and the latest Strategic Performance Plan is intended to define American diplomacy into the 21st century. According to the Strategic Performance Plan, modern diplomacy is based upon three fundamental tenets: 1) freedom is best protected by ensuring that others are free; 2) prosperity depends on the prosperity of others; 3) and security relies on securing the rights of all.⁴⁸ The plan acknowledges that globalization is a double edged sword. While it creates potential for economic growth, expands the exchange of ideas, and provides an impetus for political freedoms, it has a dark side generated by the frustrations of those who are excluded from its benefits.

The DOS and AID are anchored in the three underlying and interdependent components of the 2002 NSS - diplomacy, development, and defense. DOS diplomacy focuses on strengthening and building alliances, but is prepared to act alone when needed. The goals of the DOS include the development and expansion of free markets, globalization, and international development. It also marshals its resources to defeat global terrorism, international crime, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

There has been a sharp increase in the number of both government institutions and personnel deploying overseas as a direct consequence of the NSS emphasis on responding to threats and challenges before they can reach our shores. Most of these agencies and personnel have taken up residence in U.S. Embassies and other diplomatic posts and now outnumber DOS personnel at many of those facilities. Federal Departments and Agencies now compete as never before with the DOS, and each other, for scarce resources and office space. A typical large Embassy now has permanently assigned representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DOD), and numerous others.

This enormous overseas expansion has added to policy and operational control problems in attempting to coordinate their functions in a cogent foreign policy context. In addition, in some cases it is creating friction between their respective home agency and the DOS regarding the concept of Chief of Mission control over all elements of an Embassy.

Transformation: An act, process, or instance of transforming, or being transformed.

Transform: a) to change in composition or structure; b) to change the outward form or appearance of; c) to change in character or condition.

Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary

In a speech at Georgetown University, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice detailed some of the current challenges facing the Department and how she intends to deal with them.⁴⁹ She laid out a transformation strategy for the DOS that she referred to as “transformational diplomacy.” Her vision of the future includes a global repositioning, and restructuring. More specifically, Secretary Rice seeks to “right-size and regionalize” the numbers and locations of staff assigned overseas through coordination with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and other government agencies. These initiatives are being undertaken with the understanding that they may result in changes in the numbers or composition of staff at various U.S. missions overseas.⁵⁰

The cultural and philosophical differences between the DOS and DOD are well documented and extend to their respective approaches to strategic and operational planning.⁵¹ Consistent with the personality types that predominate in both organizations, planning is based on their own perceptions and perspectives of their respective missions.

It is fairly common for DOD employees to criticize and question the level of competency, effort, and priority given to strategic planning within the DOS and other non-military interagency partners.⁵² However, a lack of familiarity with available resources, mission priorities, and organizational structure, such criticisms are difficult, if not impossible, to justify. DOS planning encompasses three attributes that separate it from their interagency partners: 1) Department planning is not based on specific doctrine, nor is it intended to provide painstaking detail as does the DOD approach; 2) DOS sees its contribution to planning as part of the overall Grand Strategy of the NSS, and does not particularly focus on operational planning. It prefers to leave that to interagency partners in Embassy country teams; and 3) it is largely a decentralized process that in many respects starts at the bottom and works its way up. However, during the past 2 years, there is a growing realization within the Department that its planning processes must be strengthened and improved.⁵³ It now seeks to increase the level and quality of the Department's performance planning at the Bureau and Embassy level and institutionalize regular evaluation within the Department culture. The DOS has decided that a system that evaluates programs in a consistent and timely manner is critical and best supports U.S. foreign policy.

All DOS and AID strategic planning is conducted in support of the [NSS](#). This approach sets priorities and decides how the Department and AID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance. The [Strategic Plan](#) details how the Department and AID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance as outlined in the NSS. It is distributed throughout the organization as a starting point for the planning process. Embassies utilize guidance from this plan to draft Mission

Performance Plans (MPPs) for the coming fiscal year. The MPP is the product of a country team-based, joint interagency effort with the Ambassador acting as the final approver for each segment of the plan.⁵⁴ In addition to the requirements for DOS components, each element of the interagency partners are required to submit their agency specific plans for the coming year that are subsequently evaluated and inserted into the final draft. The approved MPPs are then forwarded to the corresponding regional bureau, collated with planning input from other Embassy constituents, and molded into their respective Bureau Performance Plans (BPPs).⁵⁵

Domestically based functional bureaus (non-geographical bureaus i.e. Diplomatic Security, State/Counterterrorism, Political/Military Affairs, etc.) develop their respective BPPs based on the same guidance the Embassies receive, and forward the plans to their respective Under Secretariats for vetting and evaluation. The final product is a Department-wide [Joint Performance Plan](#) that specifies the strategic and performance goals the Department and AID seek to accomplish and describes how they will measure and verify the results achieved. Recently, both the DOS and COCOMs have started to share plans, but in reality each has their own process which is largely driven through their respective stove pipes. Unfortunately, neither incorporates much of the others planning into their own.

[Funding requests](#) are derived from a combination of the Strategic Plan, MPPs, and BPPs goals, along with performance, and accountability plans. Three other documents are inherently important within the overall planning process. The [Joint Performance Plan](#) identifies strategic and performance goals and describes how the Department measures and verifies the results. The [Performance and Accountability Report](#) provides

performance and financial information to enable Congress, the President, and the public the ability to assess the performance of the Department. And finally, [Remediation Plans](#) are submitted if the Department's financial systems are not in compliance with statutory reporting requirements.

While overall DOS funding has risen since the 1990's, the increase is not proportional to those provided to the military, intelligence, and other interagency partners. Unfortunately, the slight increases in budget do not match the expanding mission of the Department. Several missions related to support of nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, and support for the GWOT were funded by diverting budgeted allocations from other Department operations. The FY-07 budget request for Foreign Operations was \$23.790B and State Department Appropriations totaled \$9.283B.⁵⁶ As a comparison, the FY-07 budget for the DOD was \$439.3B.⁵⁷ The net result is that the Department's total budget amounts to less than 5% of that of the DOD and represents less than 1% of the total federal budget.⁵⁸

The Secretary of State is responsible for administering, managing, and providing oversight to the DOS. Although the Administrator for the AID reports to the Secretary of State for oversight purposes, contrary to popular belief, AID is not a part of the DOS. The DOS is organized into 6 major sub-organizations, or Secretariats, each headed by an Under Secretary of State.⁵⁹ The Under Secretaries in turn, report to the Secretary of State through the Deputy Secretary of State, and have any number of Bureaus and other sub-organizations within their chain of command (See Chart 1.1).

Historically, changes and modifications to the DOS mission, organization, and infrastructure have been few and far between. Until the Second World War, the DOS

focused primarily on its strategic responsibilities in U.S. foreign policy and did not often venture into the realm of operational and tactical issues. However, the large-scale devastation throughout much of Europe and Japan by the end of the war required massive rebuilding of political, economic, and national infrastructure on a scale not seen before. The Marshall Plan was an example of nation building on a grand scale, and while the military carried the brunt of the load, the DOS became responsible for coordinating a great deal of the strategic, operational and oversight issues.⁶⁰

The organizational chart reflects primary strategic level “core” groupings (i.e. Political, Economic, etc.), each reporting to an Under Secretary, with various operational level bureaus sprinkled among them on the second level.⁶¹ A quick glance at the placement of operational bureaus reveals that, while many share closely related missions and capabilities, they are dispersed throughout several different core groupings within the DOS organizational chart. The placement of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), which functions as the only DOS security and federal law enforcement agency, is an example of the diffusion of operational bureaus throughout the infrastructure.⁶² DS reports to the Under Secretary for Management, along with the Bureaus for Administration, Information Management, Medical Services, Consular Affairs, Human Resources, Overseas Buildings Operations, and the Office of White House Liaison (see Chart 1.6). In the meantime, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), an entity responsible for training and equipping partner nation law enforcement agencies, resides within the Under Secretary for Political Affairs chain of command (see Chart 1.3).⁶³ As a result, narcotics and law enforcement issues are managed in a different Under Secretariat than DS. Two other operational bureaus, the Office of the Coordinator

for State Counter Terrorism (S/CT) and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS), with missions seemingly in line with those of INL and DS, report directly to the Deputy Secretary of State (see Chart 1.2).⁶⁴ Still another operational bureau, Political-Military Affairs (PM), reports to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs (see Chart 1.1.4).⁶⁵

CHAPTER 4

DOS OPERATIONAL ENTITIES

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION

The aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate the critical need for a coordinated and effective stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) program. The advantages of having a transparent, civilian-led S&R effort are apparent as the U.S. seeks to lessen its collective “footprint” in those countries. The military has taken the S&R lead in both countries due primarily to the availability of resources, logistics, and force protection capabilities, but the Administration has signaled its intent to change that paradigm. As a result of a National Security Council (NSC) decision, the DOS created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in April, 2004 (see Chart 1.2).⁶⁶

S/CRS is a true interagency entity in the sense that, while its offices are located within the Department, its workforce is made up of approximately 55 employees from State, AID, DOD, Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), CIA, DOJ, and the Department of Labor. In December 2004, the NSC’s Principals Committee approved the basic strategy for the new organization. In March of 2005, a request for \$17M was sent to Congress for start-up funding, but it only authorized \$7.7M, and that total was reallocated from the existing DOS FY-2005 budget. Two additional budget requests were forwarded to Congress seeking S/CRS earmarked funding in the FY-2006 budget. The first request was for \$24.1M for an S/CRS operational budget. The second

was a request for \$100M to fund a Conflict Response Fund, which was turned down. Within the Defense Authorization Bill, Congress granted transfer authority for up to \$200M from the DOD to DOS to fund emergency situations requiring stabilization and reconstruction. With so much budgetary uncertainty, S/CRS is still struggling to become fully operational.

National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44 assigned the DOS to lead responsibility for managing and coordinating interagency efforts related to Reconstruction and Stability.⁶⁷ With this executive authorization, S/CRS seems destined to play a major role in coordinating and implementing the critical Phase 4 of U.S. military contingency planning.

BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), often referred to within the DOS as POL/MIL, serves as the principal link between the Departments of State and Defense (see Chart 1.4).⁶⁸ These links are always important, but are vital during times of war. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continuing GWOT, have once again demonstrated the need for close coordination between the two Departments in this arena. The Bureau provides the DOD and other interagency partners with policy guidance in international security, security assistance, military operations, defense strategy and policy, and a host of other areas. PM plays a key role in securing base access and over flight permission, negotiating status of forces agreements, and coordinating participation of coalition forces for the U.S. military. It also supports regional security by creating and strengthening defense relationships, regulates arms transfers, promotes sales of U.S.

defense-related equipment, controls access to military technologies, and combats illegal weapons trafficking. PM coordinates and works closely with the DOD to provide assistance in the event of natural disasters and other crises abroad, and leads U.S. efforts to promote critical infrastructure protection around the world.

Its International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is a key component of U.S. security assistance that provides training to students from partner nations. The IMET also serves as a means to develop important professional and personal relationships key to gaining U.S. access and influence in foreign military establishments. PM also leads the campaign to secure bilateral "Article 98" agreements protecting American citizens in countries that support the International Criminal Court (ICC).⁶⁹

The Office of the POLAD Coordinator manages the Political Advisors (POLADs) assigned to U.S. military service chiefs and other principal U.S. military commanders.⁷⁰ POLADs have become indispensable assets to Combatant Commanders. POLADs can be former Ambassadors, senior State Department officers, or recently retired Foreign Service officers, and provide diplomatic and political related policy support. Their presence helps to ensure that U.S. foreign policy objectives are considered in DOD planning and military activities. The Bureau also manages the Department's participation in the State-DOD Officer Exchange Program (PM/SDE), which provides invaluable coordination for both Departments, as well as interagency cross-training and different cultural perspectives to individual participants.

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

As a widely recognized and well-regarded component of the U.S. intelligence community, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) collects and analyzes intelligence in support of U.S. diplomacy (see Chart 1.2). INR integrates all-source intelligence and reviews it for Department decision makers. It produces refined intelligence products in support of foreign policy and national security, and coordinates and reviews policy for sensitive counterintelligence and law enforcement activities.⁷¹ In addition to its primary mission, INR also analyzes geographical and international boundary issues. It is a relatively small organization with only about 300 total employees, including support staff.

Over the last several years, the bureau's methodology and quality of its personnel have been cited for their independence and effectiveness. The Senate Intelligence Committee investigating Iraq pre-war intelligence specifically endorsed the note of dissent that INR placed into the National Intelligence Estimate of 2002. According to a New York Post article by Douglas Jehl on the issue of pre-war Iraq intelligence, the bureau "got it the least wrong".⁷² The article noted that the bureau's analytical approach and the fact that many of its analysts are older and more experienced than analysts in other intelligence agencies may have contributed to their different conclusion. Many INR analysts also come from academic backgrounds, and are encouraged to become experts of a particular issue or region during the course of their career. For example, many in the team of about 10 analysts assigned to assess pre-war Iraq had more than a decade of experience with Iraqi related issues.⁷³ Another major difference between INR and its intelligence contemporaries is that it is not involved directly in the collection of

information and, as a result, has relatively little interaction with them, and is free to analyze other agencies intelligence products.

Some intelligence experts have been less complimentary and note that INR sometimes likes to play the role of “maverick” and go against the flow of its larger and more traditional intelligence contemporaries. A former career CIA official who ran INR from 2001 to 2003 stated that “the analysts....delight in being different....and not caring what other people think.”⁷⁴ INR went against the grain of the other intelligence agencies when, in a classified report in 2003, it disputed the notion that victory in Iraq would be a first step in spreading democracy throughout the Arab world. It also predicted that Turkey would not allow the transit of U.S. troops to Iraq and questioned the assertion that Iraq was attempting to procure uranium from Niger.⁷⁵ Others assert that the bureau’s successes are overblown and that you don’t tend to hear about the issues it doesn’t get right.

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS

Even before the 2001 terrorist attacks, the connection between narcotics trafficking and funding for terrorist groups had been established. For example, the tri-border region of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, has long been recognized as a center for money laundering of illegal narcotics profits, and as a source of financial and other support for Hezbollah, and possibly other terrorist groups.⁷⁶ Recent intelligence indicates the illicit drug trade in Afghanistan and other countries is helping to fund Taliban and Al Qaeda activities. The military is backing away from earlier indications that it would take

the counter-narcotics lead in Afghanistan since poppy cultivation accounts for a large proportion of the nation's economy, and they recognize there is a requirement for a civilian-led effort that would leave a smaller "footprint", but still have experience in eradication and alternative crops.⁷⁷

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) is sometimes referred to in the hallways of the Department as the Bureau of "drugs and thugs (see Chart 1.3).⁷⁸" Created in 1978 to contain the growing international drug problem, INL leads and coordinates U.S. efforts on international narcotics control and law enforcement. INL's mandate is to extend America's first line of defense through diplomatic initiatives and international programs that strengthen the commitment and abilities of foreign governments to deter illegal activities. It has a wide range of programs that provide technical support, equipment, and training to foreign governments that focus on disrupting and dismantling drug production, smuggling, and related criminal activities and organizations. In 1994, INL's mandate was broadened to include money launderers, traffickers in stolen vehicles, arms or other contraband, alien smugglers, and other forms of transnational crime.

INL works closely with friends and allies of the U.S. to reinforce efforts to promote the rule of law as part of its specific mission within the DOS and the NSS. Its programs bolster capacities of partner nations through multilateral, regional, and country-specific programs. INL advises the President, Secretary of State, other bureaus in the DOS, and other departments and agencies within the U.S. Government on policies and programs to combat international narcotics and crime. In concert with domestic drug law enforcement agencies, INL represents America in international bodies dealing with drugs.

It prepares the annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report on global drug production, traffic and abuse, and manages the drug control certification process.

The International Narcotics Control element of the U.S. foreign assistance program assists partner nation governments to define and implement strategies and programs to eliminate the production, trafficking, and abuse of illicit drugs. It seeks to convince foreign governments of the importance and relevance of narcotics control and to help stop the flow of illegal drugs to American soil.

INL's international crime program strives to combat international organized crime, since it is now recognized that the marketing and shipment of illegal narcotics requires sophisticated international criminal networks to succeed. It also seeks to strengthen national law enforcement institutions, and bolster efforts by the United Nations and other international organizations in combating international criminal activity. These programs focus on law enforcement, rule of law, and judicial and legal system development. INL leads U.S. delegations that negotiate crime-related conventions, and also works with international organizations to develop standards to stop terrorist financing, money laundering, and [anti-corruption initiatives](#).

INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMIES

In 1995, President Bill Clinton called for the establishment of International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs) to combat international drug trafficking, crime, and terrorism.⁷⁹ More than 10 years later, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) now manage ILEAs in Budapest, Bangkok, Gaborone, San Salvador, and a graduate facility in Roswell, New Mexico. In addition to enhancing international

cooperation against crime, ILEA also promotes the rule of law, improved legislation and law enforcement, and social, political, and economic stability

The ILEA program is still another tool that is a key component of nation building. INL funds were used to construct a recently opened police training center (Jordan International Police Training Center) in Amman, Jordan.⁸⁰ Although the facility technically is not considered part of the ILEA program, it provides many of the same benefits and is being used to train Iraqi police and security personnel as part of the post-conflict Stability and Reconstruction program. The ILEA program provides professional law enforcement training to enhance U.S. law enforcement linkages with host nation forces, promotes future leadership, and encourages cooperation among regional participants. To date, the program has provided advanced and specialized training to prosecutors, judicial and law enforcement officials from more than 50 countries.

The DOS, FBI, DEA, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) serve as lead agencies for the various academies. ILEA Directors report to the Policy Board and receive guidance from the Steering Group, with U.S. Chief of Mission input highly encouraged. The program requires the Director and Deputy of each academy to keep the Chief of Mission (Ambassador) fully informed of all activities and operations of the ILEA in each respective host country. Interpol, the Council of Europe, and more than a dozen countries have provided training and support to the ILEA program.

Funding for the ILEAs comes from the DOS, with the majority being provided through the INL budget, and the remainder from FSA (Freedom Support Act) and SEED (Support for East European Democracy) funds. Operational costs are defrayed somewhat

through human and material resources provided by U.S. law enforcement agencies and the respective host countries. The numbers of students at the academies have steadily increased with more than 2,000 receiving training in 2003 (Iraqi data not available), the last year with available statistics.

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) serves as the principal liaison between the Department, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), interagency partners, and the international community in support of the NSS (see Chart 1.2). The S/CT Operations Directorate coordinates with the DOD to ensure that their plans, policies, and activities support and advance approved CT policies and objectives. It also serves as the focal point control office for DoD Special Category Programs and coordinates national level Special Operations Forces (SOF) deployments and exercises overseas. As part of its effort to integrate homeland security and international counterterrorism efforts, S/CT also participates in the Homeland Security Coordination Committee and interagency working groups.

The Public Designations Unit leads DOS coordination with the Department of Treasury and the DOD to identify and designate foreign terrorist organizations and individuals and groups that provide them support. It also functions as the liaison between the DOS and interagency partners in the identification of state sponsors of international terrorism and persons, businesses, or organizations identified as having committed, threatened to commit, or have supported terrorism. S/CT then coordinates the

implementation of legally mandated and approved sanctions against violators. This effort requires close interagency coordination of diplomatic, economic, and law enforcement efforts.

Cutting off access to money, resources, and support is recognized as a viable and effective strategy to limit terrorist capabilities and movements. S/CT plays a major role in implementing the 2002 NSS by coordinating efforts to cut off financial support to terrorists. The Counterterrorism Finance Unit coordinates the delivery of technical assistance and training to partner nations and persuades their governments to improve their ability to investigate, identify, and interdict terrorist financing and other support. The Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) improves partner nation border security and their ability to identify and apprehend terrorists through a traveler information system.

One of the primary missions of S/CT is providing counterterrorism assistance, capacity building, and training to U.S. missions and foreign governments. It develops counterterrorism policy for exercises, training and assistance programs, and coordinates implementation with interagency partners and Ambassadors. In addition, S/CT coordinates policy and budget issues and designates partner nations to receive assistance from the Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA).

S/CT developed the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) concept, to deliver a rapid response to terrorist incidents. FEST, which is the nation's only interagency response team, is on call 24/7 and capable of deploying within four hours of notification. S/CT also coordinates an international WMD training exercise designed to prepare high-ranking U.S. officials for responding to a terrorist incident. The Counterterrorism Policy

Workshop provides high-level contact between U.S. and foreign officials in order to share counterterrorism “lessons learned” and improve deterrence, prevention, and reaction capabilities.

BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY

“...this long tradition of diplomacy also has been marked by more sacrifice than most Americans will ever know. There are few professions more dangerous than the practice of foreign affairs, and there are few professionals who put more on the line for this nation than the agents of the Diplomatic Security Service.” – Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, at the graduation ceremony for DS Special Agents, January 29, 2003.

Many tend to forget that terrorism has been the scourge of international diplomacy long before 9/11. It most recently came to the Department’s attention in the 1960s when several Ambassadors and other government officials were kidnapped or assassinated. Incidents of terrorism continued to increase until finally, in 1984, then Secretary of State George Shultz selected retired Admiral Bobby Inman to lead an advisory panel to review the problem and provide recommendations for countermeasures.⁸¹ As a result of the report, in 1985 the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Diplomatic Security Service were established, and President Reagan signed the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act on August 27, 1986 (see Chart 1.6).

The Bureau of [Diplomatic Security](#) (DS) is the law enforcement and security arm of the DOS.⁸² It occupies a unique niche in the Department, and among other federal agencies, in that it straddles the divide between diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, and the military. Its positioning lends itself to serving as a coordinating mechanism and point of contact between these oftentimes disparate communities. DS coordinates

emergency force protection support for DOS operations with the military when the host government is unwilling, or unable, to do so. It also works closely with military emergency action planners to update and coordinate NEO planning with appropriate COCOMs, resolves force protection issues, and provides access to host country personnel and resources to DOD and other interagency partners.

DS Special Agents (SA) are sworn Federal Law Enforcement Officers with the authority to make arrests, carry weapons, serve warrants, conduct criminal investigations, and coordinate prosecutions of criminals within the U.S. judicial system. The crimes it investigates are often committed in support of other, more serious, crimes, including international terrorism. With more than 500 SAs assigned to diplomatic missions in 157 countries, and some 500 additional assigned to domestic field offices, DS is the most widely represented U.S. security and law enforcement organization in the world.⁸³ It serves both law enforcement and security interests and functions as the subject matter expert (SME) on such matters at U.S. missions overseas. Working as Regional Security Officers (RSO) overseas, DS agents serve as the primary security and law enforcement advisor to the Chief of Mission (COM). DS also provides overseas investigative assistance to other U.S. law enforcement agencies and has achieved notable success in locating and apprehending wanted fugitives both domestically and overseas. It also conducts counterterrorism and counterintelligence investigations related to personnel, facilities, and information.

DS is responsible for the protection of government officials such as the Secretary of State, visiting foreign dignitaries, and other designated persons. Prior to 1971, it was responsible for providing protection to visiting heads of state, but with the passage of

Title 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3056, that responsibility transferred to the United States Secret Service.⁸⁴ It should be noted, however, that the aforementioned Inman Commission recommended that the function again be returned as a DS responsibility in 1985.⁸⁵

Recently, DS played a key role in post-conflict Afghanistan by providing a protective detail to then interim President Hamid Karzai, when the U.S. military unit providing his protection was transferred to Iraq. Capitalizing on the capabilities of its ATA program, it then created an Afghan Presidential Protection Service, and organized, trained and equipped the unit with host country nationals to take over protection responsibilities upon completion of their training program. In addition, DS has also provided protection, and/or established dignitary protection units for the Presidents of Haiti and Colombia and other heads of state in their respective countries.

In addition to its diplomatic protection and law enforcement functions, DS maintains a highly trained and specialized rapid-response tactical unit known as the [Mobile Security Team \(MSD\)](#), which is responsible for providing emergency security support to overseas posts. Its capabilities include high-threat dignitary protection, surveillance detection operations, and assisting with evacuations. MSD is also capable of providing security related training for embassy personnel, their dependents, and host country employees of U.S. missions, local guards and, in some instances, host country officials.

The DS Rewards for Justice program has proven to be a valuable tool in the GWOT. The program pays individuals for information that leads to the apprehension of terrorists and/or thwarting terrorist acts. Since the DS Rewards for Justice Program was initiated in 1992, more than \$49 million has been paid for terrorism-related information

that prevented acts of international terrorism against Americans or resulted in the apprehension of suspects. In 1995, working on a tip generated through this program, DS agents and Pakistani police apprehended Ahmed Ramzi Yousef, the fugitive mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. DS agents also participate in numerous criminal and counterterrorism joint task forces (JTF) and have been involved in, and contributed to, many terrorist investigations such as the attack on the [USS Cole](#), and the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.

In 1985, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) was also established as part of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act.⁸⁶ OSAC was created as a means to exchange security information between the DOS and U.S. private sector and multi-national organizations operating overseas. It currently has more than 2,500 members including businesses, religious groups, universities, colleges, and other nongovernmental organizations. In addition, many law enforcement and security organizations also utilize OSAC as a resource for overseas security information. As a measure of its effectiveness and popularity, its official website receives more than 1.8 million visitors per month. Country council programs now exist in more than 80 cities around the world, with plans to open an additional 20 in the near future.

The [Office of Foreign Missions](#) (OFM) was moved to DS in 1996, and it is responsible for servicing and regulating the activities of all foreign missions in the United States. OFM monitors privileges and immunities accorded to diplomats for signs of possible abuse, enforces reciprocity agreements, and provides official services to the foreign diplomatic and consular community. OFM also educates and advises interagency officials on diplomatic privilege and immunity issues.

ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Under the policy guidance of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), Diplomatic Security's Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) is still another valuable tool that supports the NSS and the President's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.⁸⁷ ATA programs help to strengthen bilateral relationships that advance U.S. foreign policy goals and build and sustain the international coalition in the GWOT.⁸⁸

ATA programs are intended to promote cooperative efforts between U.S. and host nation law enforcement and are designed to enhance the operational and tactical counterterrorism capabilities of participating nations. These efforts serve as force multipliers to augment U.S. counterterrorism efforts and serve as part of the first line of defense in protecting the American homeland. Since its establishment in 1983, more than 48,000 foreign officials from 141 countries have graduated from the ATA program. There have been numerous examples of ATA training that have succeeded in either thwarting terrorist threats or resulted in apprehensions of those responsible for committing terrorist acts.⁸⁹

In 2004, an elite ATA-trained Indonesian police unit apprehended a suspected member of a 12-man Jemaah Islamiya (JI) assassination team, along with 5 other JI suspects. The group had been planning attacks on the American, British, and Australian ambassadors, foreign business executives, and Indonesian public figures.⁹⁰

In 2004, Pakistan's Special Investigation Group (SIG), which had been trained, equipped and funded by ATA, apprehended suspects in the two failed assassination

attempts on President Musharraf. The group was also suspected of planning and carrying out a terrorist attack involving two car bombs targeting the U.S. Consulate General in Karachi. During the arrests, the SIG also seized computers, cell phones, and documents related to other terrorist networks.⁹¹

In 2004, Colombia's elite ATA-trained GAULA anti-kidnapping units rescued 48 hostages, including two American citizens, arrested 206 hostage takers and killed four, and recovered \$7M in ransom. Most of those apprehended were affiliated with either the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), or United Self-Defense Forces (ELN).⁹²

FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE

Professional training programs are the key building blocks to any successful institution. Dedicated on May 29, 2002, the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Institute (NFATC) is the primary training resource of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) for the foreign affairs community and the DOS (see Chart 1.6).⁹³ It provides a wide range of foreign affairs and language training for DOS employees, contractors, and officers and employees from other interagency partners. FSI provides more than 450 courses, including training in over 70 foreign languages, to students from the DOS and more than 40 other government agencies and military personnel.

FSI provides entry-level, mid-level, and advanced training for Foreign Service officers (generalist) from every cone (skill code) and DOS specialists. It also provides training for Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) and Civil Service employees from the

Department and interagency partners. FSI helps to ease the adjustment required of newly assigned personnel to live and work in foreign countries and diverse cultures, and to enhance the leadership and management capabilities of the foreign affairs community. Over the last 4 years, FSI has provided leadership training to over 7,000 government employees in the foreign affairs community.⁹⁴ In conjunction with the DS Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), FSI is also making security awareness training available to the U.S. business community. The institute also provides required personal security awareness training to all government personnel and dependents who will be working under Chief of Mission authority at a U.S. Embassy, consulate, or other post or mission abroad.

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING AND
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The DOS and USAID provide funding for the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), although the program is administered and managed by the Department of Justice.⁹⁵ Its goals are focused on investigative training and are intended to complement State's INL programs by providing more advanced and specialized training to students. ICITAP is still another potential nation building and stabilization and reconstruction tool available to interagency partners. The program enables participating foreign law enforcement organizations to function more effectively and within the rule of law, while employing accepted international police practices and meeting international human rights standards.

ICITAP provides police and criminal investigation development assistance throughout the world. The assistance can range from technical advice, training, mentoring, equipment donation, and internships with internationally recognized criminal justice organizations. Each program is specifically designed to meet host country needs and is intended to provide long-term benefits to the recipients. ICITAP is funded and capable of providing assistance to the host country to establish (or improve) a training academy to meet acceptable training standards when deemed in the best interests of the U.S.⁹⁶ The ICITAP program complements and sometimes participates in joint training with the Department of Justice's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT).

CHAPTER 5

INTERAGENCY PROCESS

Any analysis of the Department of State's (DOS) role in the interagency process (IAP) first requires an understanding of what the IAP is, how it functions, and where the Department fits into the overall picture. This chapter focuses on the various components of the IAP, and the special relationship between the Department of State and Department of Defense within the overall process.

The Interagency (IA) is an informal community of agencies that seek direction and coordination of executive branch decisions and policies.⁹⁷ The interagency process (IAP) refers to the mechanism by which the President provides that decision making and policy guidance to U.S. government institutions in order to coordinate their operations and activities. There has always been considerable debate and concerns about the efficacy of the interagency process, but since the end of the Cold War, every time the nation lives through an international political or humanitarian crisis, the hue and cry begins anew. The IAP continues to evolve beyond the recent establishment of new departments, lessons learned from IA operations, and is now being driven by an ever increasing number of innovative mechanisms. A series of studies and commissions have recommended an overhaul of the entire IAP due to perceived weaknesses in implementing operations but, to date, the IA is obliged to work through the potpourri of various processes described in this paper. This chapter provides an overall synopsis of the strengths and weaknesses of those various mechanisms and the challenges the DOS faces in working within each.

The IAP derives its principal guidance from the policies and actions of the National Security Council (NSC). In 1947, as a part of the National Security Act, Congress established the NSC to provide the President with a mechanism to integrate policies and promote cooperation between various government entities involving matters of national security. Since its establishment, the influence of the NSC in the interagency process has ebbed and flowed based largely on each President's personal management preferences and personalities.⁹⁸ The National Security Advisor and the NSC staff work directly for the President. Although the NSC was established by Congress, they have no authority over its staff or functions. Both the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense have permanent seats on the NSC, though they lack any authorities beyond their participation and votes during meetings. Presidents generally adapt its structure and function as they see fit, but most use it as a means of managing and controlling competing departments. These factors result in a wide variety of applications in which the organization can be utilized.

The NSC is composed of four statutory members (President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense). The National Security Advisor is not a statutory member, but coordinates the agenda and issues with appropriate members and disseminates decisions. Additionally, there is a group of advisors (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency), and others that are invited to participate in meetings at the discretion of the President.⁹⁹

The NSC is called into session at the President's discretion, but generally meets at least weekly, and more often during times of crisis.¹⁰⁰ It has a combination of staff, generally made up of political appointees and members of various U.S. government

departments and agencies detailed to the council. The NSC supports a combination of IA groups that include the Principals and Deputies committees, and at least eight policy coordination committees that operate at the working-level and functional level.

The four statutory members of the NSC and the principal advisors compose the Principals Committee (PC). Depending on the issue being discussed, others, such as the Secretary of the Department for Homeland Defense (DHS), and the Attorney General may be invited to attend. The Deputies Committee (DC) is subordinate to the PC, but is generally recognized for making the majority of the policy decisions. DC members are generally deputies or relevant under secretaries to the cabinet departments.¹⁰¹ The Policy Coordination Committees (PCCs) are subordinate to the DC. The membership of the PCCs is composed of senior officials from the various cabinet departments and subject matter experts. The work load of all three groups of committees has increased substantially since 9/11, and some of the coordination and implementation responsibilities normally debated at the PC and DC levels have been delegated to the PCCs. The PCCs generally conduct policy analysis and their recommendations are then forwarded to the DC and PC for decisions and/or reviewed by the President. There are also two additional special contingency groups that were established to coordinate the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq that operate outside of the normal PCC construct.¹⁰²

President Truman overcame his initial suspicion that the NSC was a legislative intrusion upon his executive power, but he and President Eisenhower recognized its value in bringing together senior policymakers and both implemented procedures that has endured until today. They created interagency committees, convened regular meetings to

coordinate policy issues, tasked the NSC with drafting recommendations for Presidential decisions, and established boards to coordinate policy development and implementation.¹⁰³ Of special significance, Eisenhower also created the position that is now known as the National Security Advisor.

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson were uncomfortable with the committees and staff created by their predecessors and relied upon a smaller, and more informal advisory arrangement, including the National Security Advisor and close friends and confidants. Kennedy began using what became known as the “Situation Room” in the West Wing of the White House for important meetings, while Johnson instituted a so-called “Tuesday Lunch” policy discussion group. These types of meetings have become institutionalized, and are now traditions that have been adopted and expanded upon by subsequent administrations.¹⁰⁴

In situations when Presidents appoint more powerful National Security Advisors, they have a tendency to intrude into the domain of other cabinet and agency heads. The independence of the National Security Advisor and NSC Staff sometimes finds them assuming functions and responsibilities normally considered within the purview of other executive level officials. These perceived incursions have at times led to fierce turf battles, heightened tensions, and bruised egos.

Presidents Nixon and Ford sought to dominate foreign policy through centralized control of the IAP. Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger as the National Security Advisor and often did not seek advice or decisions from neither the NSC nor the DOS, since he sought to control such decisions himself. White House power was extended even further when Nixon made Kissinger both National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Ford

eventually brought in Brent Scowcroft to be the National Security Advisor, but Kissinger retained his enormous power and influence over policy and the IAP and continued as the Secretary of State.¹⁰⁵

With the election of President Carter, the DOS reverted to a more prominent role in the IAP. Intent on distributing foreign policy influence more evenly within his administration, Carter appointed Zbigniew Brzezinski as National Security Advisor, to give more balance to the Department's advice and recommendations.

The Reagan administration also initially sought to establish a balanced system among the various entities within the national security affairs community.¹⁰⁶ Reagan's penchant for diffusing power and delegating authority subsequently resulted in rising tensions between the DOS and the DOD, and the NSC staff became heavily involved in policy implementation. The 1987 Tower Commission, which investigated the Iran-Contra affair, determined that the scandal was largely the result of the NSC staff deviating from its coordination responsibility and straying into the drafting and implementation of policy.¹⁰⁷ Its report noted that the affair was caused by Reagan's loose management style which did not hold individuals or entities within the NSC accountable, as well as a lack of balance between the executive and legislative branches of government, and reasserted the need for such balance.

Both Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton favored the establishment of a collegial atmosphere within the IA. Bush established a Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and eight Policy Coordinating Committees, while Clinton focused on economic issues, and extended NSC membership to include the Secretary of Treasury and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.¹⁰⁸

The Bush Administration implemented National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) 1 to establish the current interagency policy.¹⁰⁹ It identifies the PCCs as the primary group responsible for daily coordination of interagency policy. NSPD 1 directs the PCCs to provide policy analysis to the PC and DC for decision and/or forwarding to the President. Steven Hadley, the current National Security Advisor, has created a Senior Advisor for Policy Implementation and Execution, to track policy decisions made by the President, PC, or DC. This measure provides a way to measure success in the implementation of policies and was likely a response to criticisms of the ability of the NSC to coordinate interagency operations.

Some officials within the DOS are pleased with the function of the NSC in its current arrangement, and contend that the PC, DC, and PCC work just fine. However, the two DOS officials interviewed for this report work with strategic level issues, and not necessarily with issues at the operational level. Others officials who deal directly with operational level issues are frustrated that the NSC doesn't go far enough by allowing individual agencies to implement actions and operations based on their own interpretation of policy decisions. They feel, along with many in the DOD, that there is a need for a mechanism to compel action at the Department level and to not leave operations dependent upon personalities and ad hoc solutions to issues.

Although the NSC is the best known of the mechanisms to implement and coordinate national policy, there are others that operate outside of the "Beltway" in Washington, D.C. One of the most overlooked, yet effective, interagency mechanisms is the Embassy country team.¹¹⁰ Country teams are one of the most enduring examples of a successful interagency process available for study. Each country team is managed and

controlled by the respective Embassy's Chief of Mission (Ambassador). Interagency partners benefit from working with the country team concept because U.S. policy is interpreted, communicated, and executed with one voice. The Ambassador provides the President and Secretary of State expert guidance and advice on issues affecting a particular host country. He or she also directs and coordinates all U.S. government offices, personnel, and operations located in the Embassy within the framework of national level foreign policy strategy and goals. Country teams strictly maintain coordination and control over all official employees and visitors to the host country through issuance or denial of country clearances.

Country teams are considered both an asset and a source of frustration for combatant commanders and temporary duty or transiting military personnel.¹¹¹ They are an asset in that they can provide expert information and advice about the political, economic, social and other issues in the host country of assignment. However, they are sometimes viewed as a source of frustration largely because of misunderstandings and misconceptions about authorities, chain of command, and who has the "lead" authority to conduct specific actions or operations. There is also some friction that results from the fact that Combatant Commanders would prefer to deal with DOS personnel of an equal rank at the regional geographic bureau level, and sometimes bristle at the fact that they often have to deal with junior DOS officers. Since country teams do not have a regional mandate and their expertise and authority is limited to the host country, Combatant Commanders sometimes have to deal with any number of Ambassadors and country teams within the specific area of responsibility (AOR).¹¹² Additional irritation and confusion is also fueled by that fact that the Department's geographical regions

sometimes conflict with those recognized by the DOD and other government Departments and Agencies. For example, PACOM considers India to be within their geographical AOR, but the DOS placed India within its South Asian Bureau, and not the East Asia Pacific, which more closely corresponds with PACOM. The reality of these “seams” within geographical divisions mean that a Combatant Commander sometimes has to deal with two or more DOS geographical bureaus.

With the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004, some in the interagency community looked to the new organization as a possible supplement, or alternative, to the NSC in further coordinating the interagency process. The President created the NCTC to be the center for integrating and analyzing all terrorism related intelligence within the U.S. government. It also is intended to serve as a platform for the coordination and execution of strategic operational planning within all elements of national power. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act placed the NCTC in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which provides the incumbent with considerable authority to implement CT policy.¹¹³ While it is still early to judge the effects of the new organization on the interagency process, preliminary indications are that it suffers from the same lack of authority to compel action by interagency partners that the NSC does. By definition, it is also restricted to counterterrorism policy and lacks the authority or interest in becoming involved in other policy areas.

Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and largely as a response to the perceived vacuum in operational coordination, the DOD approved creation of Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) to address the operational issues and improve interagency

cooperation and coordination.¹¹⁴ JIACGs have been created within several COCOMS and DOD has recently authorized the JFCOM commander to manage and expand the program to additional COCOMS and another variation of the program called Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF) in some Joint Task Forces (JTF). In March 2002, the NSC authorized JFCOM to establish “limited capability” JIACGs in each COCOM. JIACGs and JIATFs are tailored to meet Combatant Commander’s specific requirements and issues within their AOR. Each JIACG reports through a chain of command determined by the Combatant Commander. Members of these groups are determined largely by a specific priority issue or requirement in each AOR that can range from DOS, DOJ, the Intelligence Community, and even Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). JIACGs lack any authority to compel non-DOD participants or entities to action without their voluntary cooperation. However, JFCOM states that the JIACG concept is meant to establish operational connectivity between military and civilian departments and agencies to improve planning and coordination.¹¹⁵ Still another benefit of the JIACG program is the manner it facilitates information sharing across the interagency community.

The scope and tempo of operations within a COCOM keeps individual interagency liaison officers extremely busy. The Department benefits from having exchange officers assigned to JIACGs as critical points of contact within the COCOM, and privy to ongoing activities that potentially impact on the DOS mission. The DOD also benefits from having a high-level DOS officer with experience and knowledge of the AOR available to provide advice on policies and international regulations to the JIACG. However, for the DOS and DOD to obtain full benefit of such a mechanism, more personnel (with specific career specialties) would need to be posted there.

While the JIACG is an excellent innovation, it is extremely narrow in scope and it will be difficult to expand the program due to the critical shortage of eligible and qualified DOS and other interagency exchange officers. In addition, by the nature of its organization, JIACGs are DOD-centric, and their primary mission is to serve the interests of the DOD in the AOR of the Combatant Commander. This arrangement may influence some interagency partners to think that JIACGs benefit the DOD, at the expense of the individual interagency partner's interests.

Another DOD initiative to assist interagency operations was undertaken with the establishment of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) in October, 2003.¹¹⁶ Central Command decided to create the specialized command to coordinate the political and military aspects of the war in Afghanistan and place more emphasis on the need for interagency cooperation. Prior to the creation of CFC-A, most senior military officers were located in Bagram, which posed significant problems coordinating with the Embassy and Afghan political and international diplomatic efforts in Kabul. The commanding officer decided to locate the new command close to the U.S. Embassy. He further integrated interagency coordination by maintaining an office for himself and personal staff within the Embassy proper and in close proximity to the Ambassador's office.

This simple decision enabled more agile and coordinated responses to emerging crises and issues in Afghanistan. It also sent a clear signal to the Afghan government, its people and our allies that the U.S. government was entering a new phase of the war and focusing on reconstruction and stability operations. The commander and his staff became regular participants in the Embassy's "core group" meetings, which also benefited

everyone by providing access to counterparts. In response to a request from the Special Representative of the UN, CFC-A and the Ambassador developed a plan to increase stability in southern and eastern Afghanistan. In addition to the gains in coordination, the commander also assisted the Embassy by offering the services of the Embassy Interagency Planning Group which helped to alleviate the lack of professional operational planners there.¹¹⁷ The initiative was considered a great success for all involved and many hope it will be replicated many times in the future. Unfortunately, as noted in the source article, efforts such as the CFC-A are often driven by individual personalities, and still lack formal structure and recognition to be duplicated across a wide spectrum of interagency operations.

The national security decision-making process is critical to the success of the national security interests of the United States, but most agree today that the system is in need of a major overhaul.¹¹⁸ In the absence of clearly defined and enforced leadership, the overall interagency process is sputtering. Most agencies are operating through their respective organizational “stove-pipes” without appropriate coordination with their interagency partners.

Based on the number of official and unofficial studies currently examining it, there appears to be a great deal of frustration with the existing NSC-driven interagency process. Most of the frustration stems from the fact that there is no authorized or recognized national authority to compel action throughout the interagency. There is a general feeling that with the growing complexity of international relations and modern warfare, interagency partners are more reliant on each other than ever before.¹¹⁹ Many analysts feel that the NSC process serves the strategic level of drafting policy and then

implementing it, but then fails at the operational level. These critics complain that individual departments and agencies interpret the policy as they see fit and set their own operational priorities, often out of sync with their interagency partners or the national interest. In the post 9/11 security environment, there is considerable impatience with the plethora of ad hoc processes which currently function within the interagency arena.¹²⁰ Such mechanisms must be reinvented each time, because they are neither coherent nor durable. The fact that these additional mechanisms exist only within the DOD can lead one to believe that only the DOD is not satisfied with the current IAP, or that other agencies are satisfied to let the DOD take the lead in IA coordination. There is a strong likelihood that neither supposition is correct and that the Congress should review the issue.

The inherent weaknesses of the IAP were magnified in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It quickly became apparent that the civilian agencies, which comprise the majority of the national elements of power, lacked appropriate personnel, equipment, and logistics to respond to the conflicts and sources of conflict of this nature. As a result, DOD was forced to carry an inordinate proportion of the load. The failure of the NSC to recognize the deficiencies of many interagency partners earlier in the process, and its unwillingness or inability to direct improvements of those capabilities call into question their ability to effectively coordinate complex interagency operations. While the NSC does a good job of drafting strategic level policy, there are major gaps in translating that strategy to operational level actions on the ground. Even when agencies are resourced appropriately, the stovepipe nature of the federal

bureaucracy ensures that there is a good deal of duplication of effort, and considerable “turf” battles between agencies.

The NSC seems unwilling or incapable of moving beyond its strategic planning posture which tends to leave the operational planning and dispute resolution to the individual agencies involved. The existing mechanisms that were meant to coordinate interagency operations are largely ineffective. The resulting vacuum created by this present arrangement will need to be filled by individual agencies or by a more rational and specific organization of the now informal interagency process that will appropriately address the critical security issues facing this nation.

CHAPTER 6

ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As discussed in Chapter 1 of this report, a comparison of how the DOD responded to President Bush's call for action after 9/11, and the performance of the DOD during the same period should be considered a fair measurement of where the Department is, and where it needs to go. The newly adopted 6-phase military campaign planning concept demonstrates the interdependence of the DOS and DOD in modern warfare.¹²¹ The 6-phase construct designates either the DOS or DOD with lead agency responsibility throughout the campaign plan. Most experts agree that within this new construct, the DOS and DOD split responsibility as the designated as the lead agency in at least 4 of the 6 phases, with the secondary element providing support to the designated principal. The lead responsibility transitions to either one or the other interagency partner within two additional phases, and the relinquishing element provides support to that lead. While the strategic functions of the Department continue to play an important role, its operational functions are critical to the success of phases "0" (shaping), "4" (stability and reconstruction), and "5" (enabling and transitioning to host country authority).

Modern warfare requires the full application of all elements of national power and should not be limited to traditional military participants. Non-military agencies must be capable of, and prepared to, assume traditional civilian agency responsibilities as soon as military objectives are achieved, or to the extent that local security environments allow. In reality, however, due to operational deficiencies in the DOS and other civilian agencies, responsibility for reconstruction and stabilization is not transitioning from the

military to civilian entities. As a result, the U.S. military must provide many services and functions normally associated with civilian agencies in post-conflict operations. A good example of this kind of dependency is the newly established S/CRS within the DOS. Due to funding and personnel shortfalls, the military provides the majority of the S/CRS planning element. Instead of being forced to rely on DOD assets, Congress should provide funding to enable the S/CRS to develop its own independent planning capability. S/CRS planning would complement, and be coordinated with, DOD planning to ensure seamless and timely transitions from military to civilian responsibility. In order to retain well-qualified personnel for these critical tasks, the DOS should implement internal modifications to its personnel policy to provide incentives for serving in interagency positions and related opportunities for promotion and career advancement.

The need for complementing capabilities and closer coordination between the two dominant elements of U.S. foreign policy is most evident in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the ongoing Global War on Terror (GWOT). The military's acknowledged strategic and operational planning and its robust operational capabilities made the President's decision to give the DOD responsibility for the post-conflict phases of those conflicts an easy one. The military's reserve components and National Guard give it a huge advantage over civilian agencies in being able to deploy personnel with specific qualifications and professional experience quickly and efficiently. Conversely, although Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has announced plans to create a "Foreign Service Reserve", this initiative is only now being developed.¹²² It has not yet been tested by deployment and, in reality, is a long way from fruition. In the meantime, by nature of its principle mission, the military's capacity to support deployments with appropriate

material resources is unparalleled. However, in order to avoid becoming totally dependent on the DOD, the DOS (and, by extension, the USAID) needs to develop a more robust and agile support mechanism of its own to complement that of the DOD when executing humanitarian and other stabilization and reconstruction programs. The contracting or outsourcing processes for procuring or developing these services are antiquated, are much too time intensive and, most critically, terribly inefficient. The end result of this resource imbalance is that in Afghanistan and Iraq, the military was forced to assume missions normally assigned to the DOS, but because of its lack of capacity and capability, was unable to execute.

As mentioned several times in other sections of this report, the Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized the organizational structure, function, and agility of the DOD to better integrate and coordinate its response capabilities.¹²³ The DOS organizational structure is still essentially the same as it was during the Cold War and, as new missions and responsibilities arise and entities created, the Department still sometimes places them within the organization without full consideration of their maximum effectiveness. While most national security agencies have undergone significant reorganizations to better focus and integrate security functions, the security related bureaus within the DOS remain diffused throughout its organization chart. This results in a further weakening of the DOS because its resources are not appropriately focused on the targeted mission.

The DOD has effectively taken the lead in coordinating regional interagency operations through the establishment of JIACGs, JIATFs, and other programs that promote broad-based interagency participation. It has further strengthened its hand in this area by also expanding interagency exchange programs and increasing the number of

POLADs available to Combatant Commanders. The Embassy Country Team concept continues to function as one of the most effective interagency coordination mechanisms on a country by country basis, but the DOS has not come up with an answer to the JIACGs for regional interagency coordination purposes. Making the DOD the “lead” agency in coordinating operations within “war zones” makes great sense, but ceding this function to the DOD in other areas of the globe does not. If the DOS considers itself the “lead” agency in the conduct and implementation of U.S. foreign affairs, it needs to develop a better option.

While the DOS and other civilian agencies cannot hope to match the amount of personnel and other resources available to the DOD in strategic and operational planning, there is a critical need to at least participate in, and contribute to, that function. Although the DOS excels in coordinating country specific strategic and operational planning within its country teams, it needs to develop its own system and career path that roughly parallels that of DOD to ensure it possesses an experienced cadre of planners. With the growing requirement for civilian elements of national power in the various phases of campaign planning, integrated and coordinated planning is essential. Nationally integrated planning should eliminate seams between agencies during transitions such as occurred immediately after the fall of Baghdad. If interagency post-conflict capabilities were available and deployed at the time, the Iraqi insurgency would have likely been smaller in scope or might not have even succeeded to the degree to which it did.

There is no denying the fact that within the federal budget, the DOD is a 500 pound gorilla. The DOD budget dwarfs that of every other agency or department. Current allocation levels reflect that the DOD receives more than 30 times the funding of

the DOS. However, the DOS cannot and, more importantly, should not try to compete with the DOD budget. That being said, the DOS must develop a more effective strategy to convince Congress that instead of funding the DOD to conduct DOS operations, it should be allocating that money and those resources directly to the Department. The aforementioned “lag” time between the fall of Baghdad and the beginning of the insurgency can at least be partly blamed on inadequate non-military budgets. If the DOS is successful in showing that an increased State budget will equate to increased capacity and capabilities, and perhaps more importantly, a desire and will power to assume responsibilities for those tasks. Refer to the charts attached below to view a brief summary of the strategic and operational capacities and capabilities specific to both organizations.

Phase 0 – Shaping (DOS lead)

	DOD	DOS
Personnel;	Active, Reserve Military Components, national guard units “called-up” for federal duty, civilian employees, and contractors.	Foreign Service Officers, Specialists, G.S. employees, and contractors based out of U.S. Diplomatic missions and facilities around the world.
Resources;	Support DOS, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, active, reserve, national guard units, force protection.	Limited force protection, capability and logistical support – mostly out-sourced.
Organizational structure and agility;	Regionally focused COMBATANT COMMANDS, operationally focused CJTFs, JTFs, JIACGs, and JIATFs.	Global strategic coordination with host country operational focus, USAID, S/CRS, S/CRT, INL, and U.S. Diplomatic missions and facilities.
Strategic/Operational Planning;	MDMP, National Military Strategy, Contingency Planning, Crisis Action Planning, TSCP.	DOS Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plan (MPP), Bureau Performance Plan (BPP).
Interagency leadership and coordination;	NSC representation, POLADs, JIACGs, JIATFs, War College Interagency training, and incentives to cross-train and postings, HR bridge.	NSC representation, POLADs, Embassy Country Teams, and FSI interagency training.
Budget;	\$550B (FY-2006) plus Iraq/Afghanistan supplementals.	\$30B (FY-2006), some transferred funding from DOD supplementals and other accounts.

Phase 1 – Deter (DOS lead)

	DOD	DOS
Personnel;	Active, Reserve Military Components and National Guard units “called-up” for federal duty, civilian employees, and contractors.	Foreign Service Officers, Specialists, G.S. employees, and contractors based in U.S. Diplomatic missions and facilities.
Resources;	Support DOS, STRATCOM, and TRANSCOM, active, reserve, and national guard units, force protection.	Limited force protection, capability and logistical support – mostly out-sourced.
Organizational structure and agility;	Regionally focused COMBATANT COMMANDS, operationally focused CJTFs, JTFs, JIACGs, and JIATFs.	Global strategic coordination with host country operational focus, USAID, S/CRS, S/CRT, INL, and U.S. Diplomatic missions and facilities around the world.
Strategic/Operational Planning;	MDMP, National Military Strategy, Contingency Planning, Crisis Action Planning, TSCP.	DOS Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plan (MPP), Bureau Performance Plan (BPP).
Interagency leadership and coordination;	NSC representation, POLADs, JIACGs, JIATFs. War College Interagency training, incentives for Exchange Officers and cross-training, HR bridge.	NSC representation, POLADs, Exchange Officers, Embassy Country Teams, and FSI Interagency training.
Budget;	\$550B (FY-2006) plus Iraq/Afghanistan supplementals.	\$30B (FY-2006), some transferred funding from DOD supplementals, and other accounts.

Phase 2 - Seize Initiative (DOD lead)

	DOD	DOS
Personnel;	Active, Reserve Military Components and National Guard units “called-up” for federal duty, civilian employees, and contractors.	Limited Foreign Service Officers, Specialists, G.S. employees, and contractor presence during this phase.
Resources;	TPFDD, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, fully equipped active, reserve, and national guard units.	Limited force protection, capability and logistical support – DOD dependent.
Organizational structure and agility;	COMBATANT COMMAND, CJTF, JTF, JIACGs, and JIATFs, and assume country lead.	Support DOD with coalition building, over flight, basing and prioritize preparation for post-conflict through USAID, S/CRS, S/CRT, and INL.
Strategic/Operational Planning;	MDMP, National Military Strategy, Contingency Planning, Crisis Action Planning.	DOS Strategic Plan, limited MPP and BPP until post-conflict.
Interagency leadership and coordination;	NSC representation, POLADs, JIACGs, JIATFs. War College Interagency training, and incentives for Exchange Officers, and cross-training.	NSC representation, POLADs, Exchange Officers, and limited Country Team.
Budget;	\$550B (FY-2006) plus Iraq/Afghanistan supplementals.	No budget for this activity – preparations for Phases 4 and 5.

Phase 3 - Dominate Enemy (DOD lead)

	DOD	DOS
Personnel;	Active, Reserve Military Components and National Guard units “called-up” for federal duty, civilian employees, and contractors.	Limited Foreign Service Officer, Specialist, G.S. employee, and contractor presence during this phase.
Resources;	TPFDD, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, fully equipped active, reserve, and national guard units.	Limited force protection, capability and logistical support – DOD dependent.
Organizational structure and agility;	COMBATANT COMMAND, CJTF, JTF, JIACGs, and JIATFs, and assume country lead.	Support DOD with coalition building, over flight, basing and prioritize preparation for post-conflict through USAID, S/CRS, S/CRT, and INL (limited capability).
Strategic/Operational Planning;	MDMP, National Military Strategy, Contingency Planning, Crisis Action Planning.	DOS Strategic Plan, limited MPP and BPP until post-conflict.
Interagency leadership and coordination;	NSC representation, POLADs, JIACGs, JIATFs. War College Interagency training, Exchange Officers, and incentives to cross-train and postings.	NSC representation, POLADs, Exchange Officers, and limited Country Team.
Budget;	\$550B (FY-2006) plus Iraq/Afghanistan supplementals.	No budget for this activity – preparations for Phases 4 and 5.

Phase 4 - Stabilize/Reconstruct (transition from DOD to DOS lead)

	DOD	DOS
Personnel;	Transition to post-conflict capable units and personnel including Active, Reserve Military Components, National Guard units, civilian employees, and contractors.	Increase presence of Foreign Service Officers, Specialists, G.S. employees, and contractors based in U.S. Diplomatic missions and facilities.
Resources;	Support DOS, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, active, reserve, and national guard units, force protection.	Limited capability, force protection, logistical support – DOD dependent and contracted.
Organizational structure and agility;	Return to Regionally focused COMBATANT COMMANDS, operationally focused CJTFs, JTFs, JIACGs, and JIATFs.	Strategic coordination with host country operational focus, USAID, S/CRS, S/CRT, INL, and U.S. Diplomatic missions and facilities around the world.
Strategic/Operational Planning;	MDMP, National Military Strategy, Contingency Planning, Crisis Action Planning, return to TSCP.	Return to DOS Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plan (MPP), Bureau Performance Plan (BPP) focus.
Interagency leadership and coordination;	NSC representation, POLADs, JIACGs, JIATFs. War College Interagency training, Exchange Officers, and incentives to cross-train and postings.	NSC representation, POLADs, Exchange Officers, Country Teams, and FSI Interagency training.
Budget;	\$550B (FY-2006) plus Iraq/Afghanistan supplementals.	Very limited S/CRS funding; some funding relief from DOD supplementals, and other accounts.

Phase 5 - Enable Civil Authority (DOS lead)

	DOD	DOS
Personnel;	Complete transition to post-conflict capable units and personnel including Active, Reserve Military Components, National Guard units, civilian employees, and contractors.	Maximize Foreign Service Officers, Specialists, G.S. employees, and contractors based in U.S. Diplomatic missions and facilities.
Resources;	Support DOS, STRATCOM, TRANSCOM, fully equipped active, reserve, and national guard units.	Limited capability, force protection, logistical support – DOD dependent and contracted.
Organizational structure and agility;	Regionally focused COMBATANT COMMANDS, operationally focused CJTFs, JTFs, JIACGs, and JIATFs.	Strategic focus and priority with host country operational focus, USAID, S/CRS, S/CRT, INL, and U.S. Diplomatic missions and facilities around the world.
Strategic/Operational Planning;	MDMP, National Military Strategy, Contingency Planning, Crisis Action Planning, return to TSCP.	DOS Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plan (MPP), Bureau Performance Plan (BPP).
Interagency leadership and coordination;	NSC representation, POLADs, JIACGs, JIATFs. War College Interagency training, Exchange Officers, and incentives to cross-train and postings.	NSC representation, POLADs, Exchange Officers, return to Country Team host country primacy, and FSI Interagency training.
Budget;	\$550B (FY-2006) plus Iraq/Afghanistan supplementals.	Very limited S/CRS funding; some funding relief from DOD supplementals.

An analysis of the comparison of capabilities of DOS and DOD contained in the narrative and charts above reinforces the thesis of this report that the Department of State needs to transform its operational capacities and capabilities, interagency leadership, and adapt to the challenges of the 21st Century and the Global War on Terror. There are obvious shortfalls between the capabilities of DOS and DOD, with the greater deficiency being within the DOS. Until these operational and structural deficiencies are rectified, the DOS will be unable to complete its mission without considerable help and support from the DOD and other USG Departments and agencies. The Secretary of State must follow-through on her pledge to reform the DOS and take positive steps to implement her vision for the Department. While her initiative is certainly a step in the right direction, a list of issues and recommendations are provided later in this chapter to further enhance the Department's capabilities and complete the transformation.

Although the 2002 National Security Strategy called for the transformation of the departments and agencies which comprise the elements of national security, the concept was not new by any means.¹²⁴ The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century issued on March 15, 2001, stated that:

This Commission was established to redefine national security in this age and to do so in a more comprehensive fashion than any other similar effort since 1947. We have carried out our duties in an independent and totally bipartisan spirit. This report is a road map for reorganizing the U.S. national security structure in order to focus that structure's attention on the most important new and serious problems before the nation, and to produce organizational competence capable of addressing those problems creatively.

There has been a steady, but accelerating, drumbeat for change over the last several decades, at least since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.¹²⁵ Almost all calls for change share three basic tenets: 1) ensure and enhance the security of the American homeland; 2) redesign or reorganize key institutions of the Executive Branch, and 3) reorganize Congress's role in National Security Affairs. There already have been some signs of change within the Department of State (DOS), specifically since the "transformation" speech of Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, earlier this year.¹²⁶

Because of the numerous studies and recommendations over the years, this research is based upon a small group of studies conducted since the year 2000. The analysis and descriptions provided in the preceding chapters highlighted certain issues, deficiencies, and weaknesses within the DOS organization, capabilities, and doctrine. This chapter provides descriptions of problem areas and recommends possible solutions. Recommendations are grouped according to the level of authority needed to enforce change. The recommendations are arranged into three groupings: 1) problems with solutions that can be implemented internally through DOS action(s); 2) recommended solutions that require executive action (i.e. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), etc.); and 3) solutions that require Congressional action, likely in the form of legislation and involving considerable allocation or re-directed funding decisions.

These recommendations are intended to assist in the re-shaping and re-orientation of the DOS in support of the call for transformation contained within the 2002 NSS and detailed in speeches and messages delivered by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.¹²⁷ Incremental or "band aid" approaches to transformation simply patch up or serve to

temporarily strengthen recognized weaknesses or areas of need, and will not be considered in this study. The FBI has converted its primary mission from prosecution of criminals to preventing and averting terrorists and acts of terrorism as its number one priority. While nothing that revolutionary will be proposed in this study, a meaningful transformation will enable the Department to coherently integrate its mission and goals into interagency and coalition operations, and assume a lead role in guiding that process.

ISSUES REQUIRING DEPARTMENT ACTION

ISSUE #1: As described in Chapters 3 and 4 of this report, operational bureaus are located throughout the Department of State (DOS) and fall under various Under Secretariats, or report directly to the Deputy Secretary of State. These organizations share important operational roles in overall U.S. security and foreign policy and should be more coherently grouped together to integrate and coordinate their focus, resources, and goals. Organizational reviews and reorganizations need to focus on examining not just the physical placement of components within an organizational chart, but should also determine whether those placements maximize the combined potential capabilities of the various organizations present. The aforementioned Inman Commission recommended that substantive diplomatic and policy activities be separated from those of an operational nature. In addition, the “Roadmap for National Security” Commission recognized the need for a reorganization of the DOS to clearly establish responsibility and accountability for programs, and to integrate regional and functional activities.¹²⁸ The post-911 security environment and our recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have emphasized the

need for the integration and coordination of security, intelligence, foreign assistance and training, and stability and reconstruction programs. Placing these related programs within the same “zip code” in the DOS makes good sense and will go a long way to sending a clear message to the rest of the interagency community that the DOS is serious about transforming itself into a more effective and responsive organization. This reorganization of the DOS will increase organizational capacity, enable timely, effective response capability operations, and effective change. It would also create centralized accountability for International Security instead of the existing fractured accountability that exists today.

RECOMMENDATION #1:

- *Reorganize the Department of State to group operational organizations or bureaus sharing a commonality of mission and capabilities within the same Under Secretariat. The S/CT, S/CRS, INL, DS, POL/MIL, and INR bureaus should be moved into a re-named Under Secretariat for International Security Affairs (see Chart 1.5).*

ISSUE #2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) is one of the least understood entities within the Department. Most Foreign Service Officers and other Department personnel are not even aware of the authorities and resources that DS possesses. Some employees recognize DS only for being the entity responsible for issuing identification badges and working on the Secretary of State’s protective detail, and are not aware of the numerous other programs it is responsible for. Many in the Department seem uncomfortable having a law enforcement (LEO) and security organization in their midst, and sometimes complain that having such an organization within State takes away critical resources needed for more traditional “core” activities and programs. Oftentimes, when

there is a recognized need for a professional law enforcement response to an issue, the Department will look outside for assistance and seemingly forget that the need could have filled from within. DS operates at such a low profile, that many of the studies utilized for this research did not even seem to be aware of its existence.

The Independent Task Force that drafted the “In the Wake of War” study, called for DOS to create a “new unit,...to further streamline and promote public security and rule of law programs.”¹²⁹ It also called for transferring the ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program) and OPDAT (Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training) programs to the DOS. DS federal law enforcement authorities, experience, and training would easily lend themselves to assisting the Department in responding to such challenges. Instead of allowing themselves to be used as “pass through” programs that transfer funds to outside law enforcement agencies (FBI, DEA, etc.), INL, S/CT, S/CRS, etc., should consider looking toward DS first to fill the need and then, if still more resources were needed, DS could be augmented with outside LEOs. There is a need to synchronize security and law enforcement related operations under “one roof”. Over the past decade the number of federal LEOs and officers has skyrocketed at U.S. missions overseas, to the point where the DOS is forced to compete for workspace. DOS has not taken full advantage of the authorities and perspective that DS brings to the table and needs to re-examine how it handles law enforcement issues.

RECOMMENDATION #2:

- *Institutionally recognize and enhance the Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s law enforcement authorities and capabilities and integrate them into an appropriate*

niche within the DOS. Need to Integrate and enhance DS authorities and capabilities to lead and coordinate emergency response police training and capability teams. Integrate DS input and participation into the INL and S/CT arenas, using their training, expertise, and security and law enforcement perspective to strengthen those programs.

ISSUE #3: In 1985, the report of the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security (the Inman Commission) recommended that the protection for visiting foreign heads of state be transferred back to DS from the United States Secret Service when the bureau reached the appropriate level of professional capability and experience.¹³⁰ Since then, the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) assumed responsibilities for protecting foreign dignitaries and other designated persons during visits to the U.S. In recent years, DS is proving that it has reached far beyond those capabilities with the successful protection it has provided to Afghan President Karzai, Haitian President Aristide, and more indirectly, to Colombian President Uribe. These protective details were conducted in the dignitary's home countries without the benefit of other U.S. government and/or local support. They were under constant terrorist or other threat and their security was deemed to be in the best interest of the United States. In addition to those details, DS also provides dignitary protection to various personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the post-9/11 security environment, an integration of protective functions of foreign dignitaries is preferable given the nature of transnational terrorism, and the "stove piping" of intelligence among agencies. The Department is responsible for the safety and well-being of visiting foreign heads of state and consolidating protective responsibilities within DS would eliminate still another layer of bureaucracy, promote better coordination and integration of visits within the foreign policy objectives of the country.¹³¹

RECOMMENDATION #3:

- *Transfer the responsibility for the protection of foreign heads of state from the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and into the DOS, and integrate it into the existing DS protective function. Such a transfer would integrate dignitary protection resources, and allow for closer coordination between host country embassies and the DOS. It would also integrate intelligence, centralize reimbursement funds available for other U.S. agencies and law enforcement entities, and allow the USSS to concentrate on other Homeland Security priorities.*

ISSUE #4: As mentioned in #2 above, the Independent Task Force that drafted the “In the Wake of War” study recommended that the ICITAP and OPDAT programs be transferred to the Department of State.¹³² Although the International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) is administered and managed by the Department of Justice, the DOS and USAID provide its funding¹³³ The International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) program is funded and managed by the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau (INL) within the Department, but State delegates much of the operational responsibilities to outside LEOs.¹³⁴ The goals of the two programs are focused on law enforcement and investigative training and are intended to complement other INL programs by providing more advanced and specialized training to students. Both programs are critical components of nation building and stabilization and reconstruction operations and foreign policy tools that would be better integrated into direct DOS control to support the newly established S/CRS.

RECOMMENDATION #4:

- *Bring the ICITAP and ILEA programs under direct Department of State command and control (C2) to include all Academy Directors, curriculum control, etc.) with input, advice, and resource assistance from appropriate interagency partners.*

ISSUE #5: Several of the studies utilized as resources for this research emphasized the need for the Department to receive increased funding. To better address the funding and resource issues, DOS should re-evaluate its budget requests to Congress and determine if they need to be revised with a different strategy and approach. Congress responds to a fixed constituency. The DOD, recipients of by far the largest budget within the U.S. government, has a robust constituency within the military-industrial complex and the local, state, and regional economies related to their basing and garrisoning of DOD personnel. Many feel that the DOS lacks a constituency of its own but, in truth, that sentiment is not entirely true. Besides executing U.S. national foreign policy objectives, the DOS is responsible for the promotion of U.S. business, economic, and commercial interests overseas. They are also responsible for protecting the rights and well-being of U.S. citizens and nationals abroad. This group is further bolstered by the increasing numbers of U.S. citizen and national tourists who travel to and from overseas destinations each year. When these factors are evaluated, the DOS has a healthy and considerable constituency indeed.

Senators and Congressman normally do not consider overseas considerations within their constituencies unless they serve on foreign relations, or related committees. The DOS needs to modify their budget requesting strategy to incorporate these factors, to increase the chances of their receiving heightened consideration. One of the popular

“buzzwords” over the past decade is “globalization”. Within such an economic reality, there is hardly a major U.S. company or corporation that does not have assets overseas. There are compelling national interests for the U.S. government to protect and promote those foreign interests. In addition to the traditional U.S. Chambers of Commerce throughout the world, the DOS created the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). OSAC is administered by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, but the Department of Commerce also plays a supporting role.

There are large populations of U.S. expatriates in many nations around the world. These expatriates are serviced by the DOS’ Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA). CA maintains an “American Citizens Services” section at each Embassy and Consulate overseas to provide support for expatriates and U.S. international tourists alike. Harnessing these constituencies into budget negotiations with Congress can only help illustrate the need to provide the funding needed to respond to the Department’s critical needs.

RECOMMENDATION #5:

- *Adapt strategy for requesting /obtaining Congressional funding by incorporating and utilizing the globalization of U.S. corporate/business and travel, tourism related constituencies, in addition to the considerable expatriate community currently living overseas into the DOS normal operational, and strategic funding requests.*

ISSUE #6: DOS currently has very limited “interagency” or exchange positions. As part of Secretary Rice’s call for transformation of the DOS, she stated that those numbers should increase.¹³⁵ However, in order to attract the best candidates for these jobs, there needs to be expanded career advancement opportunities for those who serve in those

billets. A well-known CSIS report credited the Goldwater-Nichols Act with providing incentive for military officers to seek joint assignments as an example of what needs to be duplicated to improve the interagency. The study recommended that national security agencies, in coordination with Congress and the Office of Personnel Management, develop a national security career path to encourage employees to seek interagency experience, education, and training.¹³⁶ In the current DOS employee evaluation system, taking positions outside of one's job specialty (or cone) is often viewed as an "excursion" tour and generally is not considered beneficial for gaining promotions. In addition, there is not a defined policy of follow-on assignments after attending an interagency advanced studies program. The Department is losing a great opportunity to capitalize on the skills and experience of such training if it does not utilize it by assigning the employee to a related position subsequent to graduation. Short and long-term training and work experience outside of the DOS should be encouraged by promotional and career opportunities.

RECOMMENDATION #6:

- *Develop a career path that creates incentives to seek out interagency assignments, education, and training. Opportunities for promotion, and upward mobility should be instituted and the Department should eventually have a requirement that employees seeking promotion to SES or FE-OC levels must have served at least one tour in an interagency assignment.*

ISSUE #7: In response to a perceived vacuum within the policy implementation and operations arena, the Department of Defense established the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACG) concept, and is continuing development of additional initiatives to assist in coordination of interagency operations.¹³⁷ As the acknowledged

lead agency in foreign affairs, the DOS needs to take a more active role in addressing interagency issues and should not rely on interagency partners or other government entities to resolve them.¹³⁸ While the Embassy country team concept is an effective interagency coordinating tool, its focus is obviously on country specific issues – not regional ones. While POLADs and personnel assigned to JIACGs and other interagency exchange positions contribute to the overall effort, the Department needs to take a more proactive approach to coordinating interagency regional strategy and operations. Instead of deferring to the Department of Defense (DOD) and other Agencies to take the lead in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and other administration initiatives, the DOS should reassert its leadership role in the implementation of foreign policy.¹³⁹

The DOS should consider establishing Regional Interagency Coordination Cells (RICCs) that correspond to the Department's geographical bureaus areas of responsibility. Given the scarcity of personnel and material resources, consideration must also be given to establishment in the Washington, D.C. area, or co-locating them in DOD Combatant Commander Headquarters. Washington based RICCs could utilize VTC technology if key personnel are unavailable for meetings and conferences. A CSIS report identified a lack of rapid civilian response capability as one of the weaknesses of the present interagency organizations.¹⁴⁰ Having a “flyaway” capability and being able to transport key personnel to a specific geographic location at a moments notice would increase the value of a RICC and build confidence among interagency partners as to the Department's capabilities and commitment. State should expand the Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST) to include more specialists to respond to emerging situations. Expanding response capabilities is one of the issues identified in a CSIS report

RECOMMENDATION #7:

- ***Strengthen DOS Regional Bureaus by creating Regional Interagency Coordination Cells (virtual and actual, with a flyaway capacity). Using the U.S. Embassy country team construct, and given its physical presence in Embassy's and Consulate's around the world, the DOS is in a unique position to coordinate regional (and country specific) strategy and operations. Expand Foreign Emergency Support Teams (FEST) to incorporate additional in-house specialists such as DS, INL, ICITAP, ATA, etc., and minimize the urge to "outsource" too many responsibilities in order to better integrate and coordinate critical operations.***

ISSUES #8: Even though many government-sponsored and independent studies recognize the need for interagency partners to integrate their planning and programs in today's interdependent world, the U.S. government still provides very little interagency training. An independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations recommended the creation of new joint training programs to expand and enhance civilian-military cooperation in the field.¹⁴¹ Recently, State's Foreign Service Institute (FSI) teamed with DOD's National Defense University to integrate training for political/military planning processes.¹⁴² While this training is proof that the DOS and DOD are making some progress, there are many other aspects of interagency actions which should be included in any training program. The need for educating interagency partners was highlighted in a recent article about the GWOT that identified the "disconnect" between State and DOD as one of the impediments to making real progress.¹⁴³ A recent study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommended that Congress establish an Interagency and Coalition Operations training center, and fund national and international training programs to promote cross-training

and sharing of ideas and perspectives.¹⁴⁴ While waiting for Congress to act, the Department should take the initiative and convert a portion of FSI's National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) into an Interagency Training Center to train senior leaders who could be utilized as part of the Regional Interagency Coordination Cells identified in recommendation #7 above. An Interagency Training Center would also provide training in integrated planning for complex contingency operations, pre-deployment training for specific operations, and new employee (contractors and direct hires) training for those about to assume responsibilities for operational planning, oversight, and coordination. The Center could focus on the collection, analysis and dissemination of lessons learned and best practices for various interagency operations.

Although it has been nearly 5 years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. still has not developed an overarching strategy on which to base policy to wage the Global War on Terrorism and meet the challenges of the 21st century.¹⁴⁵ Much like the policy of containment of the Soviet Union developed by George F. Kennan, there is a requirement for a long-term policy to deal with the threat of terrorism.¹⁴⁶ The Foreign Service has long been recognized by many as possessing some of the best and brightest minds in the United States government. Capitalizing on the facilities at the NFATC, the Department should detail a group of senior policy makers to utilize their training and experience to come up with viable options for a workable “doctrine” to fight the GWOT and other policy challenges currently facing the country.

RECOMMENDATION #8:

- *A portion of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) should be set aside and converted into an Interagency Policy and Operations training center. The DOS must act now to bring the right people together to do the job in terms of experience, training, commitment, etc.*

ISSUE #9: The DOS must prioritize the recruitment, training, and deployment of strategic planners throughout the organization. The need for synchronized and coordinated strategic planning across the interagency spectrum has been illustrated time and time again subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. Requirements for integrated planning will likely increase as we move further into the 21st century. As the natural “lead” in the implementation and execution of foreign policy, the DOS should recognize the need to expand their capacities and become leaders in strategic planning as well. A 2001 report by the United States Commission on National Security/21st century recommended that the DOS establish a single office within the Department to link strategic planning to the allocation of resources and budget requests.¹⁴⁷ The commission felt that the creation of such an office would correct what it considered a systemic weakness and enable the Secretary of State to have a more effective means to manage Department funding and resources.

In addition to training, placing, and utilizing professional planners to better manage DOS activities, they could also be used to help staff interagency personnel exchange programs, such as the DOS/DOD program. The majority of State personnel assigned to DOD JIACGs are mid to senior level Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) with

little or no experience in strategic planning. Placing trained and experienced planners in at least some of these positions would benefit the DOD by providing someone who “speaks” the same planning language as their dedicated personnel, while having a State officer involved in military planning and available to represent DOS interests. The recent establishment of the Department’s S/CRS bureau elevates the requirement for State strategic planning even higher. As the mission of the DOS continues to expand into operational areas of responsibilities, a more formalized approach to strategic planning is necessary.¹⁴⁸

RECOMMENDATION #9:

- *DOS must improve, enhance, and integrate its strategic and operational planning capabilities with those of interagency partners such as the DOD. In addition to staffing direct DOS planning requirements, they should also be assigned to various interagency exchange programs and positions within State led Regional Interagency Coordination Cells (NICCs) as detailed in recommendation #7. Curriculum at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center (NFATC) should be expanded to include strategic and operational plans training for the Department and interagency partner representatives.*

ISSUES REQUIRING EXECUTIVE ACTION

ISSUE #10: President George W. Bush took an important first step to consolidate reconstruction and stabilization resources with this recent authorization to create the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Security (S/CRS) within the DOS, and his recent Presidential Security Directive Decision identifying the Department as the lead agency to coordinate and carry out those functions.¹⁴⁹ However, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) controls many of the resources that can

be utilized with reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The United States Commission on National Security/21st century recommended that USAID be consolidated into the Department in order to integrate the nation's foreign assistance programs into the U.S. national security infrastructure (see Chart 1.7).¹⁵⁰ Consolidating USAID into State would also eliminate another layer of bureaucracy and provide the Secretary of State with more direct control over the resources needed to carry out the S/CRS mission. While budgeting of the S/CRS has been problematic since its inception, consolidating USAID into the Department would also serve to simplify appropriations deliberations with Congress since the funding would all be going to the same place.¹⁵¹

RECOMMENDATION #10:

- *The President should propose to Congress that the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) be consolidated into the Department of State. Such a transfer would more effectively integrate foreign assistance programs with diplomatic and other foreign policy initiatives. Such action would also serve to strengthen the newly created S/CRS by consolidating reconstruction and stabilization resources, while eliminating still another layer of bureaucracy.*

ISSUE #11: Congressional appropriations for the annual DOS budget are controlled by several subcommittees and taken from a number of different accounts. In recent years, federal budgets have become even more challenging with the advent of continuing resolutions (CRs). CRs have become almost a yearly occurrence, and government organizations are sometimes forced to alter scheduling and programs as a result of receiving only partial funding until the political wrangling results in an approved federal budget. However, because of its unique budgetary process, the Department of State can sometimes experience a combination of fractious appropriations and continuing

resolutions, which can seriously disrupt operations. Unfortunately, in modern politics continuing resolutions are a reality, but there have been calls for changing the way the Department's budget is appropriated. The United States Commission on National Security/21st century recognized State's budgetary dilemma and called for all Department appropriations be consolidated into a single Foreign Operations budget¹⁵². The present arrangement requires that the DOS international Affairs budget is controlled by members of the Commerce, State, and Justice Department subcommittees. The reality is that in some years those budgets are approved on different timelines, with the Department receiving only partial funding until all three budgets are passed. With today's interrelated governmental bureaucracy, disruptions to one agency's budget will very likely negatively impact the operations of their interagency partners. Given the challenges of the Global War on Terror, not to mention the continuing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the author strongly endorses the recommendations of the commission to consolidate the DOS budget into a single account.

RECOMMENDATION #11:

- *The President should propose to Congress that all funding for the Department of State be integrated into a single Foreign Operations budget. This consolidated budget should include all funding for foreign assistance programs and expenses for personnel and operations.*

ISSUE #12: As mentioned in Chapter 5, some of the DOS and DOD global regional geographic alignments are not in agreement. While this may seem to be a minor issue, other government departments and agencies have regional divisions that fit neither the DOS nor DOD models. One might assume that because the DOS is the lead U.S.

government agency for foreign affairs that their world map would be copied by others, but that is not the case. For example, the NSC divides the world into 7 distinct geographic regions.¹⁵³ These regional orientations do not appear out of sync with both the DOS and DOD models. When one considers that the NSC is responsible for coordinating and integrating the interagency process, conflicting regional orientations can be a bigger problem than assumed at first glance. Each department defines their geographical regions through various processes. For example, the DOS map can be changed through internal (administrative/management) and external (Congress, geopolitical, etc.) considerations. While there are, without a doubt, resource driven considerations for these designations, the challenges of the 21st Century demand a more seamless structure and considerations. As recommended in the “Beyond Goldwater – Nichols” study, there is a pressing need for a government-wide agreed upon common regional framework.¹⁵⁴

RECOMMENDATION #12:

- ***The President should direct the NSC to conduct a study to identify a region-defining world map that would be adopted by all U.S. government agencies. The results would be communicated through a Presidential Decision, and codified by a National Security Policy Directive (NSPD) for implementation. The President should then request that Congress further codify the findings through legislation that would be updated periodically by the NSC to reflect current world issues and realities.***

ISSUES REQUIRING LEGISLATIVE ACTION

ISSUE #13: There have been numerous commissions, studies, and reports, detailing the need for a compelling interagency operational mechanism. The Administration and, by extension, the NSC have demonstrated that they are unwilling, or unable, to address the issue. Several ad hoc and temporary initiatives have been taken by various interagency partners in an attempt to alleviate the situation, but a more formal approach is probably required. Future conflicts in the 21st century and beyond will likely have even more requirements for close coordination and synergy of operations than exist now. Many observers noted that Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that interagency coordination existed in name, but did not function as well as it should have. With some predicting the possibility of terrorists again striking the homeland and causing massive casualties and destruction, it would be wise to not tempt fate and move to address the situation now.

RECOMMENDATION #13:

- *Congress should immediately call for the establishment of a panel of present and former national level officials to review the interagency operations process and decide what, if any, changes should be made to improve it.*

ISSUE #14: There must be appropriate incentives for interagency officers to seek cross-agency assignments, training, and education. As noted in a CSIS report, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation helped to address this problem by creating the Joint Service Officer designation.¹⁵⁵ A concurrent requirement for interagency service for promotion to Senior Executive or Senior Foreign Service rank would create a similar stimulus. In addition, rotating to assignments outside of their services would serve to broaden individual work

experiences, knowledge of interagency partner operations, and create a cadre of professionals capable of being productive almost anywhere in the system.

Linking interagency rotational assignments with consideration for accelerated promotion for personnel in lower ranks would serve to accelerate the culture change and allow the individual agencies to benefit from the longer career service commensurate with such staff. Obviously, the home agency would still control the promotion process, but would have to remain in compliance with the revised OPM guidelines. One of the limiting factors regarding training and rotational tours is the issue of the “personnel float”. The military is provided a 10-15 percent additional end strength to make the joint service process work through education and training programs. If Congress were to provide a similar package to civilian interagency partners, the incentives would make it more likely that they would participate more willingly.¹⁵⁶ The resultant interagency policy development and operational experience that officers would gain could ultimately lessen the burden on the military to carry the burden in many operational aspects of the GWOT and break down the cultural barriers that hamper effective actions. **NOTE:** Recommendation #6 of this report addressed the Department of State action to be taken with this issue.

RECOMMENDATION #14:

- *In conjunction with the national security agencies and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Congress should develop a national security career path that would provide incentives to interagency professionals to encourage them to seek interagency experience, education, and training. Congress should consider approving a fixed percentage personnel float for participating agencies to enable appropriate interagency education, training, and rotations.*

ISSUE #15: Although the Secretary of State provides policy guidance and exercises oversight responsibility over the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in practice, the organization operates independently of State.¹⁵⁷ While USAID and State have traditionally worked very closely together, the result of their working relationship is that foreign assistance programs and foreign affairs are sometimes not fully coordinated. With the recent creation of the Office for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), the Department assumed responsibility for coordinating and implementing those programs. USAID possesses the capacity and capability to execute many of the S/CRS missions, but still controls its own priorities.

While nation building has become a high priority within the Administration, Congress has provided precious few resources to enable civilian institutional capacity. The President and Congress seem to be slightly out of step since neither has displayed much interest in creating a comprehensive stability and reconstruction (S&R) component.¹⁵⁸ The President authorized the establishment of the S/CRS when he signed NSPD-44, but did not ask Congress for specific funding for the new organization.¹⁵⁹ Senators Lugar, Biden, and Hagel sponsored S.209, which was intended to develop “an effective civilian response capability” that would reside in the Department and the USAID.¹⁶⁰ The bill was introduced to the Senate, but did not reach a vote and specific funding was not provided. The result is that funding for S/CRS operations is taken directly from DOS operational appropriations.

Funding is not the only issue that confronts S/CRS. There is a real shortage of qualified personnel that can be available to respond to an emergency situation. Creating and funding a Foreign Service Reserve component, similar to that which the military has,

may be one way to partially resolve the problem. The reserve could be staffed by retired foreign service officers or specialists, and augmented by civilian subject matter experts. Another major issue is equipment. Sufficient funding needs to be provided to purchase and pre-stage S&R equipment for emergency use. Consolidation of USAID into the DOS would help the situation by flattening the bureaucracy and eliminating another layer to be dealt with.¹⁶¹ **NOTE:** Recommendation #10 of this report addressed the Department of State action to be taken with this issue.

RECOMMENDATION #15:

- *In response to the President's request, Congress should consolidate the USAID into the Department of State and provide full funding to the newly created S/CRS. Such a consolidation would foster enhanced oversight and management of vital foreign assistance programs and critical stabilization and reconstruction programs that are so important to winning the war against terrorism.*

These issues and recommendations listed above should not be considered a “silver bullet” or a “cure-all” for all that ails the Department of State and the interagency system, but they should go a long way to helping make the situation more tenable. Many of the recommendations are modified or expanded versions of those explored by other studies. The overriding factor in all of this is that the Department of State is relevant, and it is working to transform itself to face the challenges of not only today, but tomorrow as well. Much work has been done, but even more still remains. The bottom line is that the Department needs an increase in personnel and resources as well as a renewed interagency focus on leadership and control.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The principal thesis of this study was that the United States Department of State (DOS) has not yet fully embraced the need to adapt to the security realities of the post-9/11 global environment. The Department continues today with basically the same mission, organization, infrastructure and resources as it did during the Cold War. Based upon the information developed during the course of the research for this study and reported in the body of the text above, I believe that my thesis still stands. As stated earlier in this paper, seams and gaps in policy and operations are magnified during times of conflict, and with the GWOT likely to continue into the near future, so transforming the Department of State is an urgent matter.

Under the leadership of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the DOS has taken some initial steps towards transforming itself and strengthening its position as one of the principal elements of national power.¹⁶² However, while the transformation process is now underway and a preliminary blueprint for change delineated, much remains to be done.

The fervor for change in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks led directly to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the reorganization of the intelligence agencies, and gave hope that the problems inherent to the interagency process would finally be addressed. However, the continuing war in Iraq, Congressional mid-term elections, and what has become a troubled second term for President George W. Bush seems to have effectively sapped any remaining enthusiasm

for additional national level reform. Given these political realities, it has become apparent that prospects for a Goldwater-Nichols II type of legislation or reorganization are indeed remote, and the national security apparatus will have to live within the existing interagency “system” for at least the foreseeable future.

Despite the lack of urgency and political willpower to reorganize the interagency process at the national level, the Department of State needs to follow through on the Secretary’s call for transformation. There are times when implemented changes from outside an organization sometimes fail to be as effective as those put into motion from within. The last chapter in this study highlighted numerous recommendations that the Department can initiate on its own to improve the organizational framework and adjust its mission to improve the system. At a minimum, given the post 9/11 reality, the Department of State must realign and reorganize its operational and security related components to better integrate them into the overall effort outlined in the National Security Strategy. If the Department fails to fully engage itself in interagency operational issues, it will be missing a great opportunity to reassume its traditional lead in shaping the nations foreign policy agenda that has eroded over the last several years.

Because of the breadth of issues currently confronting the Department of State, this study purposely focused only on operational and security related components and issues. The DOS infrastructure that supports traditional strategic responsibilities should be assessed in the same context as this research in a separate study to determine if there is a need for transformation in that area as well.

The DOS needs to make a serious self-evaluation and determine where it wants to go in terms of its continuing mission. It must decide if that mission should remain

relatively small and strictly strategic in nature, or whether it wishes to continue to evolve and take into account its operational responsibilities as well. If the Department decides to abdicate these functions to other Departments and/or Agencies, it effectively will be ceding or diminishing its traditional role of leadership in foreign policy issues. As future conflicts continue to shape our foreign policy, there will be requirements for the elements or national power to be flexible and prepared to fill unforeseen gaps in a proactive way. National interests are best served by a bureaucracy that is flexible and not afraid to adapt its mission to respond to the complexities of a given threat or crisis.

Another recommended area for future analysis is a comprehensive study of government “outsourcing” of essential responsibilities and functions. Based on analysis of recent experiences in both Afghanistan and Iraq, key government policy makers should be provided appropriate information to make critical decisions on whether to continue with current practices, or to modify or limit them in some way. Outsourcing may save the government money in the short run, but given the critical and sensitive issues related to stabilization and reconstruction operations, and the likelihood of future requirements, such a study can be extremely important to long-term U.S. policy goals.

ANNEX “A”

Chart 1.1




Chart 1.2




Chart 1.3




Chart 1.4




Chart 1.5




Chart 1.6





Chart 1.7



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